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Résumé de Synthèse 
L'objectif de ce mémoire est d'explorer ce qui nous catégorise en tant 
qu'êtres humains et nous sépare de nos réalisations scientifiques et 
technologiques. Dans son ouvrage Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, 
Philip K. Dick dresse le portrait d'un monde futuriste dans lequel la création de 
l'androïde, un automate aux traits et comportements humains, brouille la ligne 
séparant l' « humain» du « non-humain ». En établissant une confusion entre 
l'être authentique et l'artificiel, Dick expose la hiérarchie de fausses valeurs 
utilisées pour nous distinguer d'autres espèces. 
Cette analyse commence par considérer l'œuvre de Dick comme une 
reproduction de Paradise Lost de John Milton et de Frankenstein de Mary 
Shelley. Les angoisses ontologiques exprimées par les prédécesseurs de Dick 
influencent grandement l'ouvrage de ce dernier, dont la représentation des 
femmes appelle au retour d'Ève, un personnage crucial dans les textes de 
Milton et Shelley, sous forme d'une femelle « cyborg ». La deuxième partie de 
ce mémoire tente de définir l'être humain en termes d'implications biologiques, 
sociales et humanistes. La troisième et dernière partie examine le concept 
d'individualisme en tant que prérequis humain, ainsi que la relation entre soi et 
autrui. 
Sur le plan théorique, cette étude se base sur les œuvres de plusieurs 
théoriciens et critiques littéraires, y compris Harold Bloom, Lucy Newlyn, 
Marilyn Gwaltney, Sandra Gilbert et Susan Gubar, N. Katherine Hayles et 
IV 
Sigmund Freud. Les œuvres de ces derniers sont cruciales afin de comprendre 
le roman de Dick en tant que rejet de l'idéologie humaniste traditionnelle, en 
faveur d'une nouvelle philosophie posthumaine, dans laquelle humains et non-
humains peuvent coexister en harmonie. 
Mot-clés: Anxiété d'influence, cyborg, Dick, féminisme, humanisme, identité, 
Milton, posthumanisme, Shelley. 
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Abstract 
This thesis is aimed at exploring the question of what it is that classifies 
us as human beings and separates us from our scientific and technological 
constructs. Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? portrays a 
futuristic world where the creation of the android, an automaton that resembles 
and behaves like a human, leads to a blurring of the line between the human 
and the "non-human." By establishing a sense of confusion between the 
authentic and the artificial being, Dick exposes the hierarchy of false values 
used to distinguish us from other species. 
This study begins by considering Dick's novel as a rewrite of John 
Milton's Paradise Lost and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. The ontological 
anxieties expressed by his predecessors strongly influence Dick's work, whose 
representation of women calls for the return of Eve, a crucial figure in both 
Milton's and Shelley's texts, in the form of a female cyborg. The second part 
of this thesis attempts to define the human in terms of its biological, social, and 
humanistic implications. The third and final part examines the concept of 
individualism as a human prerequisite and the relationship between self and 
other. 
Theoretically, this project builds upon the works of several theorists and 
literary cri tics, including Harold Bloom, Lucy Newlyn, Marilyn Gwaltney, 
Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, N. Katherine Hayles and Sigmund Freud. 
Their works are crucial in understanding Dick's novel as a rejection of 
traditional humanistic ideology in favour of a new posthuman philosophy, 
where both humans and non-humans can coexist harmoniously. 
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Introduction 
1 1 
For years, many scholars have regarded science fiction in simplistic 
terms, as an idealistic prediction of the future. Images of extraterrestrial and 
artificially-constructed beings visiting the Earth, or living among humans, 
dominate this literary genre; and, until recently, such figures have been viewed 
as unrealistic visions of things to come. At present, with the advancing fields 
of-among others--cybernetics, artificial intelligence and virtual reality, 
science fiction has gained value as an outlining of possible future realities. In 
fact, this genre can be considered as a form of philosophical literature, by 
contemplating important anxieties surrounding the present condition of the 
human race and attempting to transcend such issues by inducing an alternate 
form of reality through fictional narrative. 
Consequently, science fiction is not limited to predictions of the future 
but inc1udes a thought-provoking insight of the present world as weB. Through 
"concéptual dislocation," the science fiction writer presents "a new idea, or a 
new variation on an old one" (Dick, "My Definition" 100), as a means of 
exposing one to new theories and thus, forcing one to re-evaluate ideas which 
they have, until that moment, taken for granted. In one of his definitions of 
science fiction, Philip K. Dick explores the displacement from the conventional 
as follows: 
If it is good SF the idea is new, it is stimulating, and probably 
most important of all, it sets off a chain reaction of ramification 
ideas in the mind of the reader; it so to speak unlocks the 
reader' s mind so that that min d, like the author' s begins to create. 
(100) 
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What Dick describes here is of particular importance because it represents the 
basis for my interest in exploring Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The 
novel opens one's mind to something that he or she has never really paid much 
attention to until that moment; a central the me in much of Dick's writing: the 
question of what it is that makes us truly human. Through his portrayal of the 
android, Dick portrays a world where it is virtually impossible to distinguish 
between humans and machines. As a result, the line separating the authentic 
and artificial being is blurred, thus creating a context wherein humanism is 
challenged and calling for a revision of the false hierarchies involved in the 
classification of the human. 
The main purpose of my thesis is to explore Dick' s philosophical 
question of what makes us human and negotiate whether or not his android 
characters can be considered as such. Within the context of this study, 1 also 
wish to delve into the matter of ontological anxieties, human identity in terms 
of the notion of "self' and the effects of sexual difference. In doing so, 1 wish 
to establish Dick's interpretation of our notions of humanism, self and gender 
as outdated, prejudiced, and binding. 
My work is divided into three chapters. The first studies Dick's 
representation of the female. By considering his novel as a rewrite of Milton's 
Paradise Lost and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Dick reveals how anxieties 
surrounding female sexuality are passed on from one generation to the next. 
Drawing upon the works of Harold Bloom and Donna Haraway, 1 will establish 
a link between Milton's Eve, Shelley's monster, and Dick's females, in order to 
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show how the anxieties of Dick' s predecessors influence his portrayal of the 
feminine and the image of the cyborg in particular. The second chapter seeks to 
construct the "human" through the exploration of its historical delineation, as 
weIl as through concepts such as free will and empathy. Through a close 
analysis of Dick's key android characters, 1 will demonstrate how the 
construction of the human is in need of revision and incorporate N. Katherine 
Hayles' theory of a reconstruction of the "human" into a new type of species: 
that of the "posthuman." FinaIly, the third chapter deals with the question of 
whether or not Dick's androids can be considered as individuals, using the 
criteria established by Marilyn Gwaltney as a guiding point. In the same 
chapter, 1 posit a relationship between the self and the psychoanalytic the ory of 
the double in order to explain Dick's use of the "uncanny" as a literary device 
in his novel. 
lt is important to mention that although Blade Runner, the film version 
of Dick's novel, has received a great de al of attention since its release in the 
1980s, 1 chose not to consider it for study in my thesis. The reason for this is 
that the film detracts from the novel by paying more attention to the futuristic 
setting l than dealing with the complex issues of humanism that are so central to 
1 Ridley Scott paints such a spectacular picture of the future that even Dick himself is said to 
have been in awe. Despite sorne of the film's shortcomings with regard to plot and character 
development, its setting is considered a visual masterpiece. As William M. Kolb writes: 
Scott's nightmare depiction of a possible future city, one of the tilm's greatest 
achievements, is revealed in isolated fragments and exaggerated detail as though we 
had actual1y traveled in time to the year 2019. You can almost smel1 the steaming 
noodle bars, the dank clothes that no one seems to change, and wet trash that 
accumulates t'aster than it can be remove. You t'eel the cold, endless rain that saturates 
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Dick's work. Furthermore, the film omits key characters (i.e. Isidore and Iran), 
crucial scenes (when Deckard is taken to an alternate police department), and 
important ideologies (i.e. Mercerism) which are integral in Dick's critique of 
the human condition. Having contemplated whether the film would provide an 
interesting contribution to my thesis, 1 decided to focus solely on Dick's novel 
because 1 found Scott's adaptation to be less affected by the anxieties of 
humanism. 
What 1 seek to accomplish through my work is a better understanding of 
how we have arrived at our present-day concept of the human and what forces 
are at play in the construction of such a theory. 1 am also interested in 
establishing the role of literature in the creation of humanism and the 
subsequent anxieties which have emerged as a result of the absolute ideals 
attached to such a concept. And 1 wish to show how, although Milton, Shelley 
and Dick replicate the same fears with respect to the human condition, the latter 
author actually calls for a change in our tradition al beliefs. For, it is only in 
doing so that we will be able to live in harmony with other unique species with 
which we share the universe. 
this gloomy megapolis, the heat of sidewalk fires keeping indigents warm, and papers 
stirring in the breeze from a passing spinner. Scott's surrealistic, frame-packed 
backdrop evokes images and feelings so overwhelming that the story suffers 
unintentionally. Visions of this garish and frightening city come back strong and vivid 
longer after we've left the theatre, a striking reminder of what cinema does at its best. 
(Kolb 133-134). 
Chapter One 
Representations of the Female: 
From First Mother, to Monstrous Other, to Female Cyborg 
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ln order to fully appreciate Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? not 
just as a narrative but as an important philosophical work which raises critical 
issues about human nature, it is imperative that one consider the novel as a 
twentieth-century rewrite of John Milton's epic, Paradise Lost, and Mary 
Shelley's gothic tale, Frankenstein. In his novel, Philip K. Dick revisits sorne 
of the predominant themes found in both Milton's and Shelley's works, namely 
humankind's ontological anxieties and our quest to eliminate death from life's 
equation. Where do we come from and where are we destined? The answer to 
both of these questions lies in a single word: woman. Dick argues that the 
origin of man is "the mother, the woman, the Earth"; that "man came from her 
and retums to her" (Dick, "The Android" 203). Although the mother is 
replaced by mechanical reproduction in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, 
her presence is felt through her absence. Through his portrayal of a world 
reduced to a wasteland where the only thing being reproduced is kipple, Dick 
paints a morbid picture of the consequences of our scientific endeavours to 
create a motherless human life; yet ev en though there are no mothers in the 
novel, the ghost of the biblical figure of Eve, our first mother, appears through 
Dick' s female characters, as it does in the works of his precursors, Milton and 
Shelley. Hence, the purpose of this chapter will be to explore the representation 
of Eve in each of the texts. By studying the works in chronological order, 
beginning with Milton, then Shelley, and subsequently ending with Dick, 1 will 
trace the shift of Eve from "first mother" to "monstrous other," to "feinale 
cyborg," which 1 will argue is the result of one author' s misreading of the other. 
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1 will also explore the ways in which Dick swerves from his predecessors by 
rewriting Eve as an andragynous entity and what this means in terms of gender. 
1 will argue that gender categories are established based on sex difference; that 
even though Dick eliminates the female's reproductive power and emasculates 
her, the gender barrier remains because of her biological dissimilarity. This 
reflects the human insistence upon designating and classifying things according 
to their similarities and differences, as weIl as exposes the raIe of biology as a 
discourse which constructs gender as a means to justify the social inequality of 
women. 
Since her appearance in Paradise Lost in the seventeenth-century, the 
figure of Eve remains the subject of a perpetuaI debate among literary critics 
and theorists which seeks to resolve whether or not Milton's portrayal of our 
first mother is misogynistic or pro-feministic. On the one si de of this debate, 
Milton is viewed as portraying Eve as infantile, powerless, corrupt, and inferior; 
as possessing no identity ofher own other than that of Adam's wife. On the 
other side, Eve is viewed in heroic terms, as a woman who rises against the 
patriarchal society which seeks to repress her and, as a result, gives birth to the 
knowledge, imagination, and free will of humankind. In this dual 
representation, it is possible that Milton purposely leaves it up to his audience 
to decide how to interpret his characterization of Eve; or, perhaps Milton 
engages in what Lucy Newlyn caBs "a complex and ambivalent game: agame 
of half-releasing, and half-restraining" (190) the feminine subject. 
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In her groundbreaking essay, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
Mary Wollstonecraft argues that Milton's Eve is the product of sexism and that 
her portrayal is degrading to the female gender: 
Thus Milton describes our first frail mother; though when he 
tells us that women are formed for softness and sweet attractive 
grace, 1 cannot comprehend his meaning, unJess, in the true 
Mahometan strain, he meant to deprive us of souls, and insinuate 
that we were beings only designed by sweet attractive grace, and 
docile blind obedience, to gratify the senses of man when he can 
no longer soar on the wing of contemplation. How grossly do 
they insult us who thus advise us only to render ourselves gentle, 
domestic brutes! (Wollstonecraft 19-20). 
Wollstonecraft accuses Milton of being a misogynist who only values women 
in terms of their beauty, submissiveness and the sexual gratification they offer 
men. The introduction of Eve in Book IV does support Wollstonecraft's claim, 
as it clearly identifies woman as man's inferior. When Satan encounters the 
first humans created by God, he categorizes the femaJe as the weaker sex: "Not 
equaJ, as their sex not equal seemed; For contemplation he and valour formed, 
For softness she and sweet attractive grace, He for God only, she for God in 
him" (Milton iv. 296-299). Eve' s "softness" and "sweet attractive grace" are 
viewed as insignificant next to the strong qualities of "contemplation" and 
"valour" used to describe Adam, whom she is to regard not just as a husband 
but as a god. 
In the process of such blind idolatry, Eve is denied the opportunity to 
grow as an individual and develop a sense of independence. Instead, Eve is 
portrayed as Adam's willing servant, his plaything, an object created for the 
sole purpose of pleasing him: "My author and disposer, what thou bidst 
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Unargued l obey; so God ordains, God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more 
Is Woman's happiest knowledge and her praise" (Milton iv. 635-638). Eve's 
dedaration of being happily ignorant of aIl things unrelated to her dut y towards 
Adam serves as an example, according to Wollstonecraft, of the male attempt to 
"secure the good conduct of women" by reducing them to a perpetuaI "state of 
childhood" (Wollstonecraft 20). Wollstonecraft contends that Milton's 
representation of our first parents in terms of "simplicity and spotless 
innocence" (Book IV 318) represents a derogatory attack on the female sex by 
arguing that: "Children, l grant, should be innocent; but when the epithet is 
applied to men, or women, it is but a civil term for weakness" (20). By 
reducing Eve's status to that of a powerless child, Wollstonecraft's case against 
Milton's negative portrayal of women becomes a strong one which, as we will 
see later on in this chapter, subsequently influences other literary critics and 
theorists to treat the figure of Eve in the same injurious manner. 
Although there is dear evidence in Milton's epic to support daims of 
misogynism, there are also textual implications of Eve as a sympathetic and 
even commendable character. Milton draws an important parallel between 
Satan and Eve, thus allowing for a pro-feminist reading of the latter as a fallen 
heroine rather th an as the birth mother of sin and death. Lucy Newlyn argues 
that, even though Milton critics accuse him of supporting patriarchal oppression 
of woman in his portrayaJ of Eve, Paradise Lost may also be considered as an 
expression of compassion for the female sex and its state of subjugation. In the 
same way that Paradise Lost deals with the notion of free will, Newlyn argues 
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that Milton's audience is given a choice between the "supertext,,2 and the 
"subtext,,3 of the epic in deciding whether Eve is a guilty party or sympathetic 
figure (155). 
Newlyn argues that the supertext of Paradise Lost exhibits signs of Eve's 
transgression before the Fall, which can be construed as Milton's judgment 
against woman, whom he denounces as a sinner (156). The authorial 
disapproval of Eve reveals itself in several scenes in Milton's epic. For 
example, his description of Eve' s hair as "dishevelled," "wanton ringlets," 
(Milton iv. 306) and "100 se tresses," (iv. 497) alludes to her seductiveness and 
the sin of lust, which manifests itself as a consequence of the Fall. Furthermore, 
Eve's association with the mythological figure of Narcissus, as she "pines with 
vain desire" (iv. 466) upon seeing her reflection in the lake, implies that Eve is 
also to blame for the emergence of a second sin: that of pride. Finally, in Book 
V, where Eve recounts her dream of flying above the earth with Satan, she is 
associated with sin, as the dream implies "her succumbing to temptation and 
portrays imagination as presumptuous and damned" (Newlyn 156). A 
supertextual reading of each of these scenes shows a persistent affiliation 
between Eve and sin which can be regarded as a harsh judgment against woman, 
whom Milton's patriarchal society blames for the Fall of man. 
2 The term "supertext" outlined by Newlyn involves the reading of Paradise Lost in the context 
of the patriarchal system which ruled in the seventeenth century. 
3 The "subtext" refers ta the consideration of Paradise Lost as a multi-faceted text with implicit 
content beneath its verbal dialogue. 
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In spite of this, Milton' s statement that the purpose of his epic is to 
"justify the ways of God to men" (i. 26) may in fact reflect the author' s attempt 
to show that Eve's disobedience is God's will and a necessary act in order that 
humankind may acquire the virtues of knowledge and free will. Although 
Eve's behaviour entails the loss of paradise, it also brings forth-through God's 
mercy-the possibility of redemption and the prospect of regaining paradise in 
the afterlife. A deeper reading of Milton' s epic reveals the author' s attempt to 
justify the ways of Eve, which are also the ways of God since He is omniscient 
and therefore knows about Eve's transgression even before it occurs and allows 
for it to happen. As a consequence, the subtext of Paradise Lost transforms the 
epic from "a model of patriarchal repression," to a statement of sympathy 
towards Eve, as well as a representation of sex as growth (Newlyn 7). 
In contrast to one's interpretation of Milton's supertext, a reading of the 
subtext allows for the implicit expression of compassion for woman, as weIl as 
the celebration of female strength and growth. Newlyn argues that a parallel is 
drawn between Satan and Eve in order to underline their "subjection to an 
arbitrary hierarchical code" (Newlyn 189). The result of this shared inequality 
draws an "alliance" (189) between the two characters. Newlyn declares that 
this bond is established by Milton, in order to derive the same sense of 
sympathy for Eve that has already been incited for Satan: 
It is [ ... ] precisely in the merging of Satan and Eve that the 
feminist possibilities of Paradise Lost reside. Eve is given the 
same legitimate cause for grievance as Satan, and the same 
ambitious potential. She can be understood and played on by 
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Satan, because she has within her the yearning for equality that 
makes him a sympathetic figure. (155) 
When Eve cornes to recognize her inferiority as a woman, she, like Satan, 
imagines "a world that is less imprisoned" (hence, her dream of flying with 
Satan) and "temptation cornes to [her], not just as an external possibility, but in 
response to a hidden impulse in [herself]" (189). Consequently, it is this hidden 
impulse which draws Eve to Satan and provokes her act of defiance as a 
"response to prohibition" (189) and as a desire to shift from innocence to 
maturity. 
Unlike the epic's supertext, the subtext of Paradise Lost incites a sense 
of compassionate understanding of Eve's oppression and strips the archetypal 
figure of her libellous designation as a villain, declaring her as a heroine instead. 
Newlyn argues that, if read in terms of its subtext, the signs of fallenness 
portrayed in Milton's work represent "the register of her dissatisfaction with the 
unfallen state, and her striving for liberation" (156). Evidence of this is found 
in Book IV, where Eve sees Adam for the first time, right after she has caught a 
glimpse of her own reflection in the lake: "Till 1 espied thee, fair indeed and 
taIl, Under a platan, yet methought less fair, Less winning soft, less amiably 
mild, Than that smooth watery image; back 1 turned" (Milton iv. 477-480). 
Rere, Eve's narcissistic behaviour may serve not as an indication of vanity but 
rather as a manifestation of self-assertion and independence from her patriarch. 
Rer turning away from Adam portrays her disappointment with her predestined 
state, as weIl as her plot to escape her fate. Rer plan, however, is foiled by 
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Adam, who calls out to her, "daims" her as his wife, and "seizes" (Milton iv. 
487) her hand until she finally "yields" (iv. 489). Consequently, Eve's 
attempted "flight" from Adam and subsequent dream of "flying" with Satan 
represent her "refusai to remain content with the place assigned to her by God" 
(Newlyn 156) and her ambition to attain a better life. On the other hand, 
Adam's intervention reflects the patriarchal society's firm hold on women, 
which seeks to keep the latter in a state of repression. 
Although Wollstonecraft argues that Eve' s innocence essentiall y 
represents her frailty, if one engages with Milton's subtext, one finds that Eve is 
depicted as anything but weak. The fact that Milton "chooses to make [Eve's] 
faIl more detailed and compelling than Adam's" (Newlyn 156) is no 
coincidence. In fact, it speaks a great deal about the author' s sympathetic 
attitude towards women, as well as his treatment of Eve as heroine. Her 
inferior status incites reader sympathy, a feeling which is eventually replaced 
by a sense of respect, as Eve aspires to rise above her state of oppression. 
Although she fails in her mission to attain godhead, Eve is nonetheless 
represented, like Satan, as a fallen heroine; for, what arises from her brave 
attempt is a thing to be revered by humankind: the birth of humanism. Prior to 
the Fall, Adam and Eve are unable to distinguish between good and evil, truth 
and falsehood. They believe without reason and serve blindly as God's subjects. 
Eve' s act of defiance is a way for her to take control of her own life and seek 
her own truths. Consequently, her transgression brings about the awakening of 
the self through knowledge, rationality, free will, consciousness and 
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imagination. Therefore, a subtextual reading of Eve reveals her strength rather 
than her weakness; for, although her "emancipation" (156) cornes with a heavy 
price (her expulsion from Paradise, the agony of childbirth, and the 
condemnation of ensuing death), Eve's fallibility allows her to "grow toward 
experience and self-knowledge" (156) and cornes with the possibilities of 
penitence and redemption. 
Among those who support Milton' s supertextual representation of Eve 
as a paradigm of female docility and submissiveness, there are a few well-
known women writers, one of which is Mary Wollstonecraft's own daughter, 
Mary Shelley. In Frankenstein, Shelley rewrites Paradise Lost as one of 
Milton's "ardently submissive daughters" (Gilbert and Gubar 220), in an 
attempt to "minister to such a father by understanding exactly what he is telling 
her about herself and what, therefore, he wants of her" (220). Baving said this, 
however, Gilbert and Gubar argue that "this apparent docile way of coping with 
Miltonic misogyny may conceal fantasies of equality that occasion aIl y erupt in 
monstrous images of rage" (220). Such images are omnipresent in 
Frankenstein, resulting in the nove}' s transformation from a rationalization of 
Milton' s misogynistic views to an expression of anxiety about the state of the 
female sex within a patriarchal society. 
Shelley' s novel serves as a Romantic adaptation of Paradise Lost, 
which-though it appears to reiterate Milton's work-in fact recreates the epic 
through the eyes of a woman. Ber endeavour to come to terms with Milton's 
text actually develops into the story of her own female experience: her 
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repression, her social exclusion, and her "monstrous" sexuality. Her doubling 
of Milton's characters through the portrayal of her own aIlow for a hidden 
context to emerge, where the image of the female is ever-present. As Gilbert 
and Gubar argue: 
Frankenstein is ultimately a mock Paradise LoSt in which both 
Victor and his monster, together with a number of secondary 
characters, play aIl the neo-biblical parts over and over again-
aIl except, it seems at first, the part of Eve. Not just the striking 
omission of an obvious Eve-figure from this 'woman's book' 
about Milton, but also the barely concealed sexual components 
of the story as weIl as our earlier analysis of Milton's bogey 
should tell us, however, that for Mary Shelley the part of Eve is 
aIl the parts. (230) 
Victor plays the parts of both God (for this creation of the creature) and Satan 
(for his endeavour to attain godhead). The creature portrays both Adam (as 
Victor's first creation) and Satan (as vengeful monster). Walton enacts the 
roles of Adam (when he is warned by Victor of the danger ofknowledge) and 
Satan (in his ambition to acquire fame and glory as the first man to reach the 
North Pole). In a novel where the male characters take center stage while the 
females play a minor passive role, it is easy to presume the absence of Eve in 
Frankenstein; yet, a more generous reading of the novel's subtext removes the 
mask of each of these characters only to reveal the face of Eve. 
The enactment of Eve can be seen during the creation of the monster, 
through SheIley's portrayal of Victor's metaphorical "pregnancy" (232) and 
subsequent labour. Gilbert and Gubar argue that the imagery surrounding this 
creation aIludes to "Eve's faIl into "guilty knowledge and painful maternity" 
(232). Like Eve, Victor aspires to attain a knowledge that is forbidden to man 
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and as a punishment, he "gives birth" to a horrifying creature. The connotative 
language found in Frankenstein serves as evidence of this: "infinite pains," 
(Shelley 34) "incredible labour," (30) "emaciated with confinement," (32) "a 
passing trance," (32) "oppressed by a slow fever," (33) "nervous to a painful 
degree," (33) "exercise and amusement would [ ... ]drive away [disease]," (33-
34) "the instruments of life," (34) etc. This depiction is particularly significant, 
not just because it calls to mind the birth of man' s sin, but because it locates the 
exact point in the novel when Victor realizes his role as Eve. 
Prior to this scene, Victor undergoes a transformation from the figure of 
Adam (during his innocent youth) to that of Satan (in his adult years); and yet, 
as Gilbert and Gubar argue, the shadow of Eve always lurks: "If the adult, 
Satanic Victor is Eve-like both in his procreation and his anxious creation, even 
the young, prelapsarian, and Adamic Victor is-to risk a pun-curiously 
female, that is, Eve-like" (234). An ex ample of this can be traced in Victor's 
keen interest in Iiterature as a means of discovering "the tremendous secrets of 
the human frame" (Shelley 32), which is contrasted with Eve's craving for 
"intellectual food" (Gilbert and Gubar 234). Another hint of Eve' s presence 
can be found when Alphonse Frankenstein dismisses Victor's reading of 
Cornelius Agrippa4 as "sad trash" and warns his son not to waste his time upon 
such a book. Alphonse's "censorship" (235) of Agrippa's book leads Victor to 
believe that his father is selfishly withholding "useful knowledge" (Shelley 21). 
4 Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535), a German physician and author of De Occulta 
Philosophia (1531); also a reputed magician. 
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Similarly, Eve resents God's control over knowledge and aspires to see as He 
sees by eating the forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge. Although such 
scenes clearly portray the lingering spectre of Eve, it is only during the novel's 
creation scene that Eve actually materializes; for, it is precisely at this moment 
that Victor "disco vers he is not Adam but Eve, not Satan but Sin, not male but 
female" (Gilbert and Gubar 234). This self-discovery also leads Victor to 
realize that being born a female means to bear Eve's scars, which mark her as 
fallen and brand her as a hideous monster to be despised. 
Victor' s creature can be considered as the embodiment of female 
monstrosity, as his physical disfigurement evokes Eve's "moral deformity" 
(Gilbert and Gubar 241). Furthermore, his narrative serves as a "philosophical 
meditation" (235) on the unfortunate position of women in a patriarchal society, 
where their sexual difference is feared and abhorred. According to Gilbert and 
Gubar: 
The discovery that one is fallen is in a sense a disco very that one 
is a monster, a murderer, a being gnawed by 'the never-dying 
worm' and therefore capable of any horror, including but not 
lirnited to sex, death, and filthy literary creation. (234-235) 
The images of the "monster," the "murderer," and the criminal who is 
"gnawed" by her guilty conscience; each of these can be associated with Eve 
and her fallenness. Victor' s creature encompasses aIl of these figures, as weIl 
as their respective associations with "sex," "death," and the "filthy" mingling of 
the two with respect to female reproduction. Shelley' s depiction of the creature 
as a monstrous version of Eve reflects the patriarchal supertextual reading of 
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Paradise Lost and establishes how such an interpretation shapes her 
generation's perception of women. 
Anne K. Mellor offers an insightful reading of the patriarchal fear of 
female sexuality, as weIl as the need to control that which is arguably the most 
valuable of female qualities, that which sets her apart from a man, her capacity 
to reproduce. Mellor argues that: 
By stealing the female's control over reproduction, Frankenstein 
has eliminated the female's primary biological function and 
source of cultural power. Indeed, for the simple purpose of 
human survival, Frankenstein has eliminated the necessity to 
have females at aIl. (274) 
Frankenstein's desire to eradicate the female altogether represents the cultural 
anxiety of the other and also "supports a patriarchal denial of the value of 
women and of female sexuality" (274). In considering the Genesis story, one 
may argue that female otherness stems from God's creation ofwoman as an 
"afterthought;" as a being moulded from man's remains; as one who se purpose 
is to be, as Milton writes, man's "other half' (Book IV line 488). Despite her 
status as God's "second-favourite" creature, however, she is endowed with the 
ability to give birth to a human life, which elevates her status to that of a deity. 
The fact that such a power is reserved only for the female instils feelings of 
envy, fear and even hatred in the male, which are then followed by his need to 
retaliate, in order to gain a sense of control. This representation of the intense 
need to overpower the female is at the heart of Shelley's novel, wherein 
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Victor's desire to "pursue nature to her hiding places" (Shelley 32), portrays a 
type of rape metaphor: 
At every level Victor Frankenstein is engaged upon a rape of 
nature, a violent penetration and usurpation of the female' s 
'hiding places,' of the womb. Terrified of female sexuality and 
the power of human reproduction it enables, both he and the 
patriarchal society he represents use the technologies of science 
and the laws of the polis to manipulate, control and repress 
women. (281) 
The feminization of nature, as well as Victor's narrative of "rnidnight 
labours," "unrelaxed and breathless eagerness," "the horrors of [ ... ] secret 
toils" and "dabbl [ing] among unhallowed damps," (32) create a gothic setting 
in which nature and Victor appear to engage in a rape-like struggle. This 
violent the me is repeated several times throughout the novel, to show that no 
matter how much Victor tries to control his desire "to rape, possess, and destroy 
the female" (Mellor 281), the urge is-like his creature-monstrous and cannot 
be quelled. 
One of the most significant recurrences of the rape theme occurs when 
Victor destroys the female creature he has undertaken to create for his monster. 
In his narrative, Victor relates how "trembling with passion" he "tore to pieces" 
(Shelley 115) the half-finished female. The brutality exercised by Victor 
reflects his affirmation of the "male control over the female body, penetrating 
and mutilating the female creature at his feet in an image that suggests a violent 
rape" (Mellor 279). This act is particularly important because of its 
exemplification of the male fear of female sexuality and the need to eliminate 
any potential of a sexually liberated woman, who poses a threat to the 
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patriarchal rule. Such a fear is evident in Victor' s justification for the 
termination of the female creature: 
[ ... ] she might become ten thousand times more malignant 
than her mate, and delight, for its own sake, in murder and 
wretchedness. He had swom to quit the neighbourhood of man, 
and hide himself in deserts; but she had not; and she, who in aIl 
probability was to become a thinking and reasoning animal, 
might refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation. 
They might even hate each other; the creature who already lived 
loathed his own deformity, and might he not conceive a greater 
abhorrence for it when it came before his eyes in the female 
form? She also might tum with disgust from him to the superior 
beauty of man; she might quit him, and he be again alone, 
exasperated by the fresh provocation of being deserted by one of 
his own species. 
Even if the y were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts 
of the new world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies 
for which the daemon thirsted would be children, and a race of 
devils wou Id be propagated upon the earth, who might make the 
very existence of the species of man a condition precarious and 
full of terror. Had l a right, for my own benefit, to inflict this 
curse upon everlasting generations? [ ... ] l shuddered to think 
that future ages might curse me as their pest, whose selfishness 
had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price perhaps of the 
existence of the whole human race. (Shelley 114-115) 
At first, Victor's reasoning appears to involve his fear of creating another 
violent being; however, as he continues to rationalize, it becomes clear that the 
determining factor behind his decision to destroy the female creature has to do 
with his anxieties about the creature's possible assertion of independence and 
her unrestrained sexuality. Victor is afraid that the female will resist the male 
creature' s attempt to control her and as sert the right to be her own person, think 
freely, and make her own decisions and choices. He is terrified at the notion 
that the two creatures may actually loathe one another, and even more so at the 
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possibility that the female may prefer to mate with biological men. Victor 
imagines the outcome of such a partiality as horrifie, as it would lead to the 
rape of these men by the female creature, whose immense size and strength 
would overpower them (Mellor 279). Lastly, what Victor dreads most, and 
what leads him to savagely tear the female to pieces, is her ability to procreate 
an entire species of monsters which, he perceives, would threaten the human 
race. Consequently, Victor's pre-meditated slaying of the female creature 
represents the patriarchal fear of the revolutionary modern woman, who Mellor 
describes as "sexually liberated, free to choose her own life, her own sexual 
partner (by force, if necessary)" and one who "defies that sexist aesthetic that 
insists that women be small, delicate, modest, passive, and sexually-pleasing-
but available only to their lawful husbands" (279). The emergence of such a 
woman breaks the carefully-constructed gender rules and threatens the 
patriarchal society on which su ch rules are founded. Consequently, Victor's 
response to the potential of such a woman is by carrying out the patriarchal 
desire to silence the woman by stifling her. 
Although the female creature represents a literaI interpretation of 
woman as monstrous, there are also many metaphorical implications in 
Shelley' s novel which link female sexuality with death. 1 have already 
established one of these factors in my analysis of Victor's allegoricallabour 
scene, wherein he gives birth to Eve, who simultaneously acts as the epitome of 
life and forerunner of death. Another ex ample of the juxtaposition of sex and 
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death occurs in Victor's nightmare on the night in which the monster makes his 
first appearance: 
1 slept indeed, but 1 was disturbed by the wildest dreams. 1 
thought 1 saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the 
streets of Ingolstadt. Delighted and surprised, 1 embraced her; 
but as 1 imprinted the first kiss on her lips, the y became livid 
with the hue of death; her features appeared to change, and 1 
thought that 1 held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms; a 
shroud enveloped her form, and 1 saw the grave-worms crawling 
in the folds of the flannel. (Shelley 34) 
Victor's dream is a crucial scene in Frankenstein, not only for its association of 
the female body with sex and death but also because it reflects Shelley's own 
personal sexua] awakening. William Veeder recalls an event from Shel1ey's 
youth, where she and Percy Shelley fifSt declare-and possibly even 
consummate-their love on her mother's grave. Veeder analyzes the symbolic 
nature of this act by arguing that: "Making love to the daughter involves Percy 
with the mother; uniting with the living woman bonds him with the dead" (114). 
ln considering Victor's dream, this "blurring" (114) of daughter with mother 
can be interpreted as Shelley's portrayal of the familial relationship between 
female sexuality and death.5 Sex equals death for Shelley, in more ways than 
one. Rer mother dies just days after she is born. Rer first sexual encounter 
occurs by her mother's grave. She becomes pregnant and gives birth to a 
daughter who dies shortly afterwards. Consequently, Shelley's description of 
Victor' s dream illustrates the female transformation from virginal innocence to 
5 George Levine argues that: "Every death in the novel is a death in the tamil y, literai or 
figurative" (213). Moreover, Ellen Moers declares that: "Death and birth were thus as 
hideous1y mixed in the Iife of Mary Shelley as in Frankenstein's 'workshop of filthy creation'" 
(221 ). 
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sexual maturity. As long as a woman is ignorant of her sexuality, she remains, 
as Elizabeth initially appears, "in the bloom of health." Once she is exposed to 
the male "embrace," however, she is afflicted with the fatal disease of death.6 
The grotesque image of the worm-infested "folds" of the mother's flannel "both 
refer to and veil the underlying maternaI folds" (Joseph 29). In doing so, 
Shelley represents female sexuality, not as a positive promise of life but, as the 
gruesome omen of mortality. 
Shelley' s representation of woman as the spectre of death also stems 
from her reading of Milton's Eve as a criminal who is responsible for the 
demise of humankind. Not only does Eve represent death in the natural sense, 
that is, as the Earth-Mother from whom we set forth in life and to whom we 
return in death; but, as C. S. Lewis argues, Eve is also connected to death in the 
sense that her "folly, malice, and corruption" lead to the "genesis of murder" 
(126): 
[ ... ] she remembers that the fruit may [ ... ] be deadly. She 
decides that if she is to die, Adam must die with her; it is 
intolerable that he should be happy, and happy (who knows?) 
with another woman when she is gone. 1 am not sure that critics 
always notice the precise sin which Eve is now committing, yet 
there is no mystery about it. Its name in English is Murder. 
(125). 
Lewis' s theory of Eve as the original source of murder is a theme which is 
reiterated in Frankenstein. The females in Shelley's nove} are not only haunted 
6 Here, "death" is meant not just in the literaI sense but tïguratively speaking as weIl. Victor's 
dream functions as a foreshadowing of the death of his wife. Linda Gill argues that Elizabeth's 
murder on her wedding night represents the death of woman as a subject once she is married 
(96). 
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by Eve' s crime but continue to be punished for it. The slaying of William 
serves as evidence of this. As 1 have already established, Victor's monster can 
be interpreted as Eve's monstrous double. If read in such a context, one may 
argue that Eve is responsible for William's murder. Although Eve is guilty of 
this horrendous crime, the women in Frankenstein's circle suffer the 
consequences. As Gilbert and Gubar contend, "Elizabeth and Justine insist 
upon responsibility for the monster's misdeed" (232). For example, Elizabeth 
proclaims, '''0 God! 1 have murdered my darling infant''' (Shelley 45); yet one 
may argue that it is in fact the voice of a remorseful Eve that we hear. 
Moreover, Justine's confession and punishment for a crime she does not 
commit serves as an ominous reminder of the original sin. As the daughters of 
Eve, both Elizabeth and Justine "inherit" their mother's sin and, therefore, 
assume their responsibility as the "murderesses" of humankind. 
The idea of the female image as "inherited" calls to mind Harold 
Bloom's theory of "Poe tic Influence," which deals with (but is not limited to) 
the anxiety that is felt by a strong poet with respect to the literary tradition 
shaped by the major poets of the past. As already established in this chapter, 
Milton's epic is a rewrite of the biblical story of Genesis, which deals with his 
anxiety about the Fall and justifies the ways of God, the Father, to man. In turn, 
Shelley revisits Paradise Lost in order to rationalize the ways of Milton, the 
father, to woman. Though both Milton's and Shelley's work attempts to stay 
true to the influential writings of their predecessors, they engage in what Bloom 
terms "poetic misprision," or a misreading of the precursor: "Poetic Influence-
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when it involves two strong, authentic poets,-always proceeds by a 
misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and 
necessarily a misinterpretation" (30). Milton's misreading of The Book of 
Genesis unconsciously leads to the emergence of a subtext in which Eve is 
praised rather than blamed for the Fall. As for Shelley, she too misreads7 
Milton by portraying Eve as a monstrous creature, thus, completely 
disregarding the "open-endedness" (Newlyn 5) of Paradise Lost. This 
misreading can be interpreted as the result of a type of struggle between the 
"father-poet" and the "offspring-poet," wherein the latter seeks to "correct" 
what they believe are the shortcomings of the legacy left behind by the former. 
In exploring the works of Paradise Lost and Frankenstein, the precursor text 
and its successor, one is able to see the circulations of various readings of Eve 
throughout literary history. In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Dick can 
be considered as the "grandchild-poet" resulting from the int1uence of Milton 
7 1 feelthat 1 must clarify what it is that 1 mean by Shelley's "misreading" ofMilton's text, in 
order to avoid confusion with regards to my earlier argument that the reader has a choice in 
interpreting the supertext or subtext of Paradise Lost. What 1 mean by "misreading" involves 
Shelley's complete oversight ofMilton's subtext. 1 refer to Newlyn who argues that: "The 
subtext of Paradise Lost offers a valuation of the fallen world which is integral to its meaning. 
Ali readers, at sorne level or other, respond to the insistent pressure of this subtext: it is the 
price of experience that they should do so" (65). Perhaps as a result of her mother's writing 
(which Shelley is sa id to have memorized word per word), Shelley misreads Milton's epic as a 
misogynistic text. If Frankenstein is to be considered a rewriting of Paradise Lost, as argued 
by countless cri tics, it should afford the same type of subtext: a celebration of woman 
underneath a plot which alludes to the female as a monstrous murderess. Instead, Shelley's 
nov el offers nothing positive in its portrayal of women. Even those who consider Milton a 
misogynist cannot argue that the ending of Paradise Los!, where Adam and Eve leave Paradise 
hand in hand, creates a sense ofhope and rebirth. Shelley's novel offers no such refuge, as ail 
the female characters in the novel die, thus, leaving no potential for an optimistic outcome. 
Furthermore, the allusions present in Paradise Lost "guide the reader toward an interpretative 
choice" (68). In Frankens!ein, such a choice is not afforded. 
and Shelley; a ghostly presence felt in the form of a struggle between the 
familiar voices of his ancestors, which collide with his own voice. 
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ln "Man, Android, and Machine," Dick argues that his writing 
represents characters who wear Ha mask over a face" whose "true face is the 
reverse ofthe mask" (213). In applying this statement to Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep? the android masquerading as human is not the villain one 
expects it to be because of our general misconception "that only bad people 
[wear] frightening masks" (213). Instead, behind the mask is a person more 
human than humans themselves. The words of Dick coincide with those of 
Bloom, who argues that: "The strong poet peers in the ITÙrror of his fallen 
precursor and beholds neither the precursor nor himself but a Gnostic double, 
the dark otherness or antithesis that both he and the precursor longed to be, yet 
feared to bec orne" (147). Here, B100m asserts that poetic influence does not 
necessarily recreate the image of the dead poet. Instead, it reflects the 
successor poet as opposing alter ego of his/her forbear, which is both liberating, 
as il breaks free from the binds of the past, and frightful, because his/her work 
loses its legitimacy as a strong literary work in a tradition passed on from one 
major poet to another. In considering Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
as the end result of the influence of Milton and Shelley, 1 will demonstrate how 
the figure of the female cyborg Ca term which 1 will use from here on 
interchangeably with the "android") wears a mask on top of another mask. 
Upon the removal of the initial mask, the face of Shelley' s monster is revealed. 
ln turn, when the final mask is removed, we see the face of Milton's Eve. 
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What is interesting about Dick's rewriting of Eve is the way in which he 
chooses to pick up where Shelley leaves off in his successful scientific creation 
of the female. In a sense, Dick picks up the pieces of Frankenstein' s mangled 
creature and puts them back together, adding mechanical components and 
removing that which Victor feared most: her sexuality. This is the precise 
moment where Dick makes a "revisionary swerve"s in his rewriting of 
Shelley's tale in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? where he succeeds 
where Frankenstein has failed; that is, in creating an androgynous female. The 
name for such a being is termed by mainstream science fiction as the "cyborg." 
B Y eliminating female sexuality in the figure of the cyborg, 1 will argue that 
Dick creates a seemingly genderless being; yet, despite their androgynous 
nature, such cyborgs continue to be haunted by the figure of Eve and the 
femininity she has come to represent. Finally, 1 will show how, regardless of 
the cyborg's inability to procreate, Shelley's theme of "monstrous" 
reproduction is reiterated in Dick's work, as a means of showing the self-
destructive consequences of usurping the female's reproductive powers. 
Deriving from the term "cybernetics," which involves a science that 
studies electronic and mechanical devices and compares them to biological 
systems, the cyborg can be defined, in general terms, as: "a creature of 
interdependent cybernetic and organic elements" (Mason 225). A more 
8 The swerve, or c/inamen, referred to by Bloom relates to the modern poet's breaking-away 
from his "Poetic Father" (42) by swerving from his precursor's context and establishing his 
own original idea. Bloom uses Satan's Fall as an ex ample, by arguing that if. in falling from 
Heaven, he had swerved slightly instead of allowing himself to drop straight 10 the bottom, he 
might have landed in a different place and created something of "Great Originality" (34) rather 
than simply opposite. 
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exhaustive delineation of the cyborg, however, is drawn from the work of 
Donna J. Haraway, who first introduced this figure in 1985. In "A Manifesto 
for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," 
Haraway defines the term as foIlows: "A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a 
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as weIl as a 
creature of fiction" (50). The cyborg is not just a character from a science 
fiction novel, but a product of our "lived social relations," which play a crucial 
role in the construction of our political views, thus creating what Haraway caIls 
"a world-changing fiction" (50). We are aIl cyborgs, Haraway argues, because 
we live in a time where, through "imagination and material reality," we 
"theorize and fabricate" (50) ourselves into a state of "cyborgism." 
What is particularly striking about Haraway's manifesto is her 
representation of the cyborg as "a creature in a postgender world" (51). She 
argues: 
It has no truck with bisexuality, pre-Oedipal symbiosis, 
unalienated labor, or other seductions to organic wholeness 
through a final appropriation of aIl the powers of the parts into a 
higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the 
Western sense [ ... ] An origin story in the Western humanist 
sense depends on the myth of original unit y, fuIlness, bliss, and 
terror, represented by the phaIlic mother from who aIl humans 
must separate [ ... ] The cyborg skips the step of original unit y, 
of identification with nature in the Western sense. (51) 
Because it has no origin story, or subsequent sources of information of 
scientific and theoretical nature which spring forth from that origin story, 
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serving as a means of categorization, there can be no construction of gender or 
gender roi es. What this removal of gender entails is an independence from 
Western society's "domination of abstract individuation," a resolution of 
"partiality," a "revolution of social relations in the household," and a 
"reworking" of Nature and culture, where the one no longer seeks to 
appropriate or incorporate the other (51). Both science and humanities have 
served as a gender-constructing discourse through the placing of the male and 
the female into polar and hierarchical groups wherein the latter is always 
classified as inferior to the former (Kirkup 4). The image of the cyborg 
expresses the limitations of such a reductive theory by "suggesting a way out of 
the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves" (Haraway 57). Although Dick appears to do just that, through his 
elirrlination of sex difference in his portrayal of the female cyborg, the 
androcentric novel cannot escape the sense of anxiety in terms of female 
sexuality, artificial femininity and the haunting image of Eve. 
In an age of constant technological advancement, the science fiction 
genre visualizes what Mary Ann Doane calls "a new, revised body" (110) as a 
direct result of the interconnectivity between technology and the body; one 
which questions the idea of sexual difference as a classifier of human identity. 
Dick' s elimination of sexuality through his portrayal of the female android 
exemplifies Doane's notion of a new body: that of the "andr(oid)-ogyny,,,9 a 
creature both male and female in nature. The female physical appearance, 
9 A term cleverly coined by Vivian Sobchack. 
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coupled with the male inability to give birth, renders Dick's cyborgs as 
androgynous; yet even so, the mingling of feminine and masculine entails only 
a blurring of gender, not its eradication. For instance, it is worth noting that 
Dick's portrayal of the female android steps away from the view of the woman 
as weak, domestic, passive, and gentle. Instead, the female androids are strong, 
intelligent, vicious, and skilful. Moreover, unlike the women in Shelley' s novel, 
Dick's feinales play an assertive, important role in the plot development. Take 
Rachael Rosen, for example, who causes Deckard to develop feelings of 
empathy for androids; who tricks him into sleeping with her in order to impede 
his bounty hunting efforts; who murders his Nubian goat. Or, take Luba Loft, 
who cleverly confuses Deckard's reading of the Voight Kampftest and stages 
. the novel's climactic scene, wherein she calls Deckard's own humanity into 
question. Even so, it is equally important to recognize that despite these 
prominent female roles, Dick's novel also subjugates and objectifies the female 
androids. Although the Rosen Association chooses to deprive the female 
android of reproductive capability, ironically, it takes great pains to ensure that 
they possess ail the components needed to engage in "convincing" (Dick 170) 
sexual relations with human men. In fact, Rachael' s declaration that "we 
androids can't control our physical, sensual passions" (Dick 172) suggests that 
one of the features built in the female Nexus-6 androids is that of serving as a 
sexual toy for human men. 
If one is to regard Dick' s representation of women in this way, it 
becomes evident that the author is exercising the same type of "half-releasing, 
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and half-restraining" of women as Milton does. On the one hand, the female 
androids are stripped of their reproductive power and given strong male 
characteristics, which seem to render them as man's equal; on the other hand, 
Dick restores their femininity in terms of the sexual gratification that they, like 
Eve, are expected to provide to men. Doane argues that su ch double 
representation stems from our fears concerning the subsequent loss of 
"knowledge of origins and subjective history" (117) through the achievement of 
technological reproduction; anxieties which are, as Doane explains, displaced 
onto the image of the female: 
[ ... ] technology, the instrument of a certain knowledge-effect, 
becomes spectacle, fetish. But one gains ascendancy at the price 
of the other-pleasure pitted against knowledge. Historically, 
this dilemma has been resolved [ ... ] by conflating the two-
making pleasure and know ledge compatible by projecting them 
onto the figure of the woman. (117) 
The patriarchal desire to produce a motherless being is a quest for knowledge. 
Technology is the result of that pursuit. Acquired knowledge through 
technology becomes an obsession, as shown in Dick's novel, as it is no longer 
simply about controlling the reproduction process but also about satisfying the 
male's fetishes. The more importance allotted to knowledge for pleasure, the 
better the chances of losing sight of who we are as human beings and where we 
come from. Dick's portrayal of the female android serves a reminder, in a 
world "overwhelmed by the special effects which are the byproducts of [ ... ] 
technology" (117), of the know ledge of origins. Rachael Rosen, the first 
android of her kind, is the result of the scientific pursuit of knowledge. In turn, 
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knowledge is associated with the tree from which Eve eats the forbidden fruit. 
Rachael is then "linked to the mother's body" (117), to Eve, reminding us of 
ontological history. 
The loss of history as a result of motherless reproduction also entails the 
lack of a potential future. According to Doane: "Reproduction is that which is, 
at least initially, unthinkable in the face of the woman-machine. Herself the 
product of a desire to reproduce, she blocks the very possibility of a future 
through her sterility" (112). In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? sterility 
is a the me which is emphasized through the novel's characters, as weIl as its 
setting. The view of motherhood as "a limit to the conceptualization of 
femininity as a scientific construction of mechanical and electrical parts" (112) 
is evident in the Rosen Association' s decision to create a female android 
without reproductive components. And, as 1 will now argue, the consequences 
of such actions are felt aU too strongly in Dick's novel. 
ln contrast to Shelley's representation of the fear of monstrous 
procreation, Dick depicts the horror of a sterile Earth. In his portrayal of the 
aftermath of World War Terminus, Dick paints a morbid picture of a desolate, 
dying planet: "The morning air, spilling over with radioactive motes, gray and 
sun-beclouding, belched about hi m, haunting his nose; he sniffed involuntarily 
the taint of death" (Do Androids Dream 5). The scene portrayed in the novel is 
reminiscent of Milton's description of the gates of Hell, which "stood open 
wide, belching outrageous flame" (x. 232). Whatthis suggests, then, is that the 
absence of the maternaI creates a Hell-on-Earth, or as Christopher Palmer 
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describes it, "a sterile wasteland, composed of slug, ash, trash, rust, the pulped 
undifferentiated residue of a civilization which has destroyed itself and now 
nourishes nothing" (91). Man' s ultimate victory over the maternaI can be 
represented by their building of a nuclear weapon so powerful, that it wipes out 
Nature (the term is meant in the context of Earth-Mother) completely. Such a 
usurpation, however, does not come without a heavy price. First, the 
radioactive du st causes the graduaI deaths of numerous animal species. Then, it 
begins to afflict humans with the debilitation of mental faculties. Fina]Jy, the 
destruction of Nature, which results from the male desire to acquire 
reproductive power actually, ironically ends in his own sterility as weIl. 
In a setting plagued by infertility, the only sense of reproduction cornes 
from the nove]' s incessant technological replication of materiaI objects. For 
instance, Rachael Rosen te]Js Deckard that she is one of many identicaI Nexus-
6 androids, one of which is the renegade android, Pris Stratton. She evidently 
explains her existence to Deckard by stating "l'm just representative of a type" 
(Dick, Do Androids Dream 165). The concept of reproduction through 
repetition becomes a disturbing theme, especially in the scene where Deckard 
and Rachael engage in sexual relations. Under normal circumstances, the 
sexual act which occurs between the two characters could carry symbolic 
implications of unit y and the potential for regeneration. However, as Patricia 
Warrick points out, it in fact becomes a monstrous scene associated with 
dislocation and death, since Pris, Rachael's double, mutilates a spider at the 
same time that Rachael is making love to Deckard (Warrick 128). The 
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lovemaking between the two characters in volves the theme of repetition as a 
means of reproduction in other ways as weIl. First, because of the fact that 
Rachaellater informs Deckard that she has in fact repeated the act with other 
bounty hunters "seven," "eight," "nine times" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 175). 
And finally, in the notion that, by making love to Rachael, Deckard has in 
effect slept with an army of Rachael Rosens (Dick, "Notes on Do Androids 
Dream" 159), since, as she acknowledges herself, she is not a real person but a 
representation of a type. 
Frederic Jameson refers to the depiction of "kipple" as another negative 
portrayal of reproduction in Dick's novel. Jameson defines "kipple" as "Dick's 
personal vision of entropy, in which objects lose their form and 'merge faceless 
and identical, mere pudding-like kipple piled to the ceiling of each apartment.' 
(from Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep ?)" (346). The reproduction of 
material objects in Dick's novel is interpreted by Jameson as the "obsessive 
compensatory theme of reproduction" (346). In a world where the population is 
diminishing, objects begin to take the place of humans, as a way to fill the 
Earth's empty spaces. This state of "kipple-ization," however, leads to 
confusion, disorganization and chaos. But more importantly, when the only 
things being reproduced are useless objects, the world experiences the "death of 
the subject", or "an end to individualism so absolute as to call into question the 
last glimmers of the ego (347). 
In a novel filled with notions of sterility, motherlessness and monstrous 
technological reproduction, it is difficult to locate a potential of hope and 
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regeneration. And yet, through his portrayal of Iran, the novel's main human 
female character, Dick off ers this sense of optimism. In essence, Iran 
represents the Earth Mother, Eve, and the most revered of her daughters, the 
Virgin Mary. Iran is the embodiment of these female archetypes because she 
takes on the "burden" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 211) of Deckard's hardships 
as if she went through them right alongside him. Furthermore, she is a source 
of solace to her husband, or what Dick refers to as "man's consolation," his 
"return to the mother, the woman, the Earth" (Dick, "The Android" 203). 
ln "The Android and the Human," Dick argues that woman is endowed 
with the ability to "reveal the authentically human" (202). This is highlighted 
in Iran' s ability to recognize the artificiality of Deckard' s toad when he does 
not. Iran's experiences a form of epiphany at the end of the novel, wherein she 
finally understands what it truly means to be human: to feel a sense of 
empathetic concern for another human being, a need to connect with another 
person, a desire for the well-being of others, and most importantly the ability to 
feel human emotions without the need of a mood organ. These are the things, 
as Dick portrays through Iran's shift of attitude towards her husband, which 
constitute the true meaning of humanness. 
ln "The Android and the Human," Dick contends that woman is a key 
figure in establishing the true meaning of humanness because of her ability to 
endure and transcend suffering and create life even in the midst of death. In 
terms of Christian ideology, Dick's theory holds true. If one is to consider 
Christ as the saviour of humankind, then one must afford the same 
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consideration to the Virgin Mary. Although it is Christ who is beaten and 
tortured, Mary suffers alongside him. As a mother who watches helplessly as 
her only son is being subjected to the most cruel and unjust persecution 
imaginable, Christ's physical pain equates to Mary's emotional anguish. As 
Dick contemplates the crucifixion scene, he remarks that the difference between 
the two spiritual figures is that Mary, the woman, is able to somehow survive 
the ordeal, while Christ, the man, perishes: 
It is not only an intrinsic property of the organism, but the 
situation in which it finds itself. That which happens to it, that 
which it is confronted by, pierced by, and must deal with-
certain agonizing situations create, on the spot, a human where a 
moment before, there was only, as the Bible says, clay. Such a 
situation can be read off the face of many of the medieval Pietàs, 
the dead Christ held in the arms of his mother. Two faces, 
actually: that of a man, that of a woman. Oddly, [ ... ] the face 
of Christ seems much older than that of his mother [ ... ] and 
yet she came before him. He has aged through his entire life 
cycle; she looks now perhaps as she always did, not timeless, in 
the classical sense, but able to transcend what has happened. He 
has not survived it; this shows on his face. She has. In sorne 
way they have experienced it together, but they have come out 
of it differently. It was too much for him; it destroyed him. 
Perhaps the information to be gained here is to realize how much 
greater capacity a woman has for suffering; that is, not that she 
suffers more than a man but that she can endure what he can't. 
Survival of the species lies in her ability to do this, not his. 
Christ may die on the cross, and the human race continues, but if 
Mary dies, it' s aIl over. (Dick, "The Android" 202) 
Dick's argument that the sustenance of the human race rests on the female 
capacity to transcend anguish evokes one of Christ's final utterances, where he 
tells his mother "Woman, behold your son" and then turns to his disciple and 
says "Behold your mother" (The Holy Bible: King James, John 19: 26-27). 
This phrase can be interpreted as Mary' s association with the prospect of 
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rebirth when faced with death. If one considers Christ's statement as extending 
beyond just the disciple, one may argue that Christ declares Mary to be the 
mother of aIl people and she who carries the promise of the salvation of 
humankind. 
The same prospect of rebirth in an environment filled with death and 
decay can be found in Dick's portrayal of Iran Deckard. As 1 will now argue, 
through her association with the Virgin Mary, Iran represents the emblem of 
hope for a future wherein the Earth's vitality is restored. Furthermore, she is 
depicted as the potential saviour of the human race. 
When Deckard returns home at the end of his bounty hunting mission, 
he brings with him a box containing an electric toad lO which he finds in the 
de sert. Iran remarks how Deckard holds the box "as if it contained something 
too fragile and too valuable to let go of' (Dick, Do Androids Dream 212). She 
resolves that it must hold "everything that had happened to him" (212). 
Symbolically, the box contains Deckard's tribulations, the metaphorical 
crucifixion of the person he used to be prior to his realization that "electric 
things have their lives too" (214). The fact that Iran takes the box from 
Deckard suggests her willingness to look inside and understand Dick's pain, 
even carry his burden as if it were her own. Like the Virgin Mary, whose face 
10 In terms of imagery, the toad is an ambivalent animal. Generally, it is considered a negative 
symbol, representing "darkness and evil, avarice and lust" (Tresidder 480). Through its 
amphibian transformation, however, the toad signifies "birth and re-birth," "longe vit y and 
riches" (480). To connect this to Dick's novel, the toad portrays the present state of the earth as 
a desolate wasteland; however, through Deckard's maturity, it also symbolizes the impending 
birth of the android race (which is implied through the electric nature of the toad) and rebirth of 
humankind. 
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gives Christ a moment of consolation while on the cross, Iran provides solace to 
Deckard. Furthermore, the association of Deckard's slumber with "long 
deserved peace," as weIl as Dick' s portrayal of "dust sifting from his clothes 
and hair" (215) as he lays on the bed, suggest the character's symbolic 
reconciliation with the Earth Mother through a form of death metaphor. The 
novel ends on a bright note, however, with Iran's determination to maintain the 
arti~cial toad's "vitality" (216), which exemplifies Dick's argument that the 
survival of a species depends on the female. The description of a "perpetually 
renewing puddle" (216), which the pet store clerk suggests for the electric toad, 
can be interpreted as an obvious indication of the novel' s optimistic conclusion. 
Water is, after aIl, considered as a symbol of life, cleansing and rejuvenation. 
In this final scene, Dick connects the figure of the female with the symbol of 
water in order to conclu de that woman is the essence of human life and that it is 
only through her that the "perpetuai renewal" of human Iife can continue to 
exist. 
ChapterTwo 
Defining the "Human" 
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ln a speech given at the Vancouver SF Convention at the University of 
British Columbia in 1972, later published under the title "The Android and the 
Ruman," Philip K. Dick states that man's mechanical creations are coming to 
life: 
[ ... ] our environment, and 1 mean our man-made world of 
machines, artificial constructs, computers electronic systems, 
interlinking homeostatic components-all of this is in fact 
beginning more and more to possess [ ... ] animation. In a very 
real sense, our environment is becoming alive, or at least quasi-
alive, and in ways specifically and fundamentally analogous to 
ourselves. Cybernetics, a valuable recent scientific discipline 
[ ... ] saw valid comparisons between the behaviour of 
machines and humans-with the view that a study of machines 
wou Id yield valuable insights into the nature of our own 
behavior. (183-184) 
This statement is particularly important, not only because it reflects Dick's 
science fiction works, many of which deal with the humanization of robots, but 
because the author makes us realize that this romanticized notion may not be as 
far-fetched as one would think, if we were to apply it to our every day lives. As 
humankind strives to create a state of utopia through the creation of artificial 
constructs built to better our lives, Dick believes that we are losing the vitality 
that makes us human and are turning into the mechanical beings represented in 
his works, while his android characters, so feared for their artificiality, are 
actually corning to life and displaying genuine human traits. In arguing this 
fact, Dick forces us to take his work more seriously, that is, not just 
as a fantasy novel but, as a philosophical text aimed at exposing the pseudo 
definition of the "human." 
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Similarly to the study of cybernetics, Dick uses androids in Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? as a device in order to demonstrate the blurring line 
between the human and the non-human, or machine. Although the novel was 
written in the late 1960s, Dick, like other science fiction authors, foresaw the 
creation of a being physically identical to humans. In his work, he portrays a 
futuristic world, set in 2021, where humankind has created a type of robot that 
is arguably more authentically human, in terms of our conventional definition 
of humanness, than an actual biological person. Dick would not live to see how 
what may have seemed like a fantastic notion at the time was actually on its 
way to become a reality, and sooner than he thought. The end of the twentieth 
century saw both scientific and technological breakthroughs in the creation of 
Dolly, a genetically cloned sheep, as weIl as through the production of 
mechanical constructs (i.e. computers, automated telephone response lines, toys, 
etc.) that look, think, and act, human. Much of Dick' s science fiction, which 
questions society's conventional definition of humanness in a world where 
those who we caU non-human often display more human characteristics th an 
human beings themselves, may very weIl transfigure into a moral dilemma. 
With the fast-paced advancement of the scientific and technological 
fields, it may simply be a matter of time before the world is introduced to the 
first lab-produced or mechanically-generated human being. If faced with such a 
future, how are we to distinguish between the human and the "non-humanT' 
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How can our perception of humanness remain stagnant in a world of constant 
evolution, where the conception of a new species is viable? These are some of 
the questions dealt with in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? which 1 will 
seek to answer later on in my thesis but first 1 will examine the various 
characteristics considered to be human and seek to understand how Dick views 
our definition of humanness as problematic. 
If someone were to ask us to define what it means to be human, we 
wou Id probably be inclined to point out our bioIogicaI components. In 
technical terms, humans are bipedal primates originating from the mammalian 
species of Homo sapiens. Factors su ch as evolution, physiology and genetics, 
constitute our scientific classification as human beings. Yet if we descend from 
mammals and still share most of our DNA with our evolutionary relatives, the 
chimpanzees, why are the latter classified as animaIs rather than humans? The 
answer to this is that biology is only one of the criteria necessary to be 
considered human. Society and culture also play a crucial role in establishing 
what is considered human and what is not. 
Though biology defines the human from a physical and scientific 
standpoint, society and culture determine what il means to be human in terms of 
one' s behaviour and actions. Each of these factors has pIayed a vital role in the 
formation of our traditional definition of the "human." In a social context, to be 
human means to be capable of abstract reasoning, language and self-reflection. 
It also relates to the ability to create groups and social structures, ranging from 
families to nations, by communicating and exchanging ideas with others; to 
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establish traditions, rituals, values, ethics and laws, aH of which represent the 
foundation of human society. What defines the human in terms of culture is 
one's desire to understand the world that surrounds himlher, to uncover his/her 
purpose on Earth, and to account for unexplainable phenomena through 
mythology, philosophy, religion and science. In a cultural context, our 
traditional perception of the human also refers to our appreciation for beauty 
and aesthetics through means of expression such as art, literature, and music. 
Besides the biological prerequisites, the social and cultural aspects form a 
blueprint of what constitutes the human and any being that falls short of one of 
these crucial elements, or that fails to develop any of the previously mentioned 
abilities and behavioural patterns, is excluded from the human and categorized 
as non-human instead. 
Society appears to place more weight on the social and cultural factors, 
in order to distinguish the human from the non-human because it deems su ch 
factors as inherently human traits. In fact, most dictionary definitions for terms 
that contain the word human focus on behaviour rather th an biology. For 
example, "human-words" such as "humane," "humanitarian," and "humanity," 
are linked with concepts of sympathy, kindness, emotion, and philanthropy, aH 
of which relate to one' s conduct towards others, rather than his/her genetic 
make-up. In Dick' s novel, the definition of the human is intricately linked with 
the concept of empathy, the ability to put oneself in someone else's shoes and 
recognize that person as a human being and not just an object. In Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? the only means to distinguish the androids from 
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humans is by testing one's empathy using the Voight-Kampff device; yet to 
imply that being human means to possess the ability to be empathetic towards 
others, raises serious concerns, as there are certain groups that do not possess 
this quality and still faH under the category of the "human." If one agrees that 
empathy is something which is learned rather than inborn, then it is morally 
unjust to "retire" beings that have been denied the opportunity to develop this 
characteristic. After aH, if we were to exercise the same means of 
extermination on the mentaHy ill, or even young children, who are unable to 
display empathy towards others due to their under-developed, or infantile minds, 
our actions would be branded as immoral and inhuman. 
In considering aH the factors discussed as a model used by humans to 
distinguish themselves from others, 1 wish to apply these prerequisites to Dick's 
portrayal of the androids, in order to determine whether they can be considered 
human. Although the biological differences prevent androids from being 
classified as humans, Dick's mechanical constructs are portrayed as being 
physically identical to human beings and as displaying remarkable 
characteristics that are distinctively human in nature. 1 will argue that even 
though the y do not share the same genetic make-up as human beings, the 
androids should not be stripped of their right to be recognized as human. 
Having been created by man, and in man's image, they are the 
"technologically-induced" offspring of humankind, a new breed of 
"transformed humans," or "metahumans" (Barr 25). Even though the y do not 
possess aH of the attributes found in human beings, to deny their existence as 
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significant entities of the universe and dismiss them as a threat to humankind 
would be to commit anthropocentrism. 
Dick creates android characters that possess such striking human 
attributes, that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between them and their 
human counterparts. In doing so, the author points out the arbitrariness of the 
definitions assigned and rules enforced by man in order to depict the human 
(Barr 25). If one analyses the main android characters in Dick's novel, it is 
clear that the li ne between the human and the non-human is not only blurred but 
virtuallyerased; something that Dick does on purpose to free the notion of 
humanness from its confinements and prove that it can encompass other beings, 
such as the organic constructs in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
ln the character of Roy Baty, the renegade android leader, we see that 
what appears as a cold-blooded mission to destroy humankind may in fact be 
that Roy is forced to resort to violence because he is overwhelmed by the 
human need to survive and protect his species. Roy is not trying to usurp man 
by mimicking him. He is simply being human and trying to give purpose to his 
life by adopting the same values, ideologies and practices employed by humans 
and to ensure the welfare of his fellow humanoids. Dick highlights the 
humanness in his android characters, as thus: 
1 have, in sorne of my stories and novels, written about androids 
or robots or simulacra-the name doesn't matter; what is meant 
is artificial constructs masquerading as humans. Usually with a 
sinister purpose in mind. 1 suppose 1 took it for granted that if 
such a construct, a robot, for ex ample , had a benign or anyhow 
decent purpose in mind, it would not need to so disguise itself. 
Now to me, that then seems obsolete. The constructs do not 
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mimic humans; the y are, in many deep ways, actually human 
aIready. They are not trying to fool us, for a purpose of any sort; 
they merely follow lines we follow, in order that they, too, may 
overcome such common problems as the breakdown of vital 
parts, loss of power source, attack by such foes as storms [and] 
short-circuits [ ... ] (Dick, "The Android" 185) 
Having failed to pass as a human and induce the sense of empathy through 
drugs, Roy finally understands that androids are in fact different from human 
beings; but they are nonetheless human. Roy' s hope is that once Buster 
Friendly reveals the truth behind Mercerism and exposes "the whole experience 
of empathy [as] a swindle" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 185), the human race 
will be forced to reconsider their concept of the human and accept androids as 
sacred beings who have the right to exist and enjoy the same rights and 
freedoms as human beings. 
The character of Irmgard Baty, Roy's wife, also possesses significant 
characteristics which make it difficult to identify the human and the android. 
The first and most obvious is her physical appearance. In her depiction as 
"lovely in the manner of Greta Garbo, with blue eyes and yellow-blonde hair", 
Irmgard clearly represents the epitome of female beauty (Dick, Do Androids 
Dream 134). Because of humankind's fascination with beauty and its treatment 
as an aesthetically pleasing, valuable art, one can easily be distracted by 
Irmgard's striking beauty and fail to notice that she is an android. Furthermore, 
Irmgard seems to understand the human condition more than the other androids, 
even if only from an objective standpoint. Although she cannot fully 
comprehend human emotions, for example, she cannot understand Isidore's 
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distress when she and her android companions eut the legs of spider to see what 
will happen, Irmgard appreciates the way in which Isidore has accepted them 
without prejudice and, at times, even seems sympathetic towards him. 
Although both Roy and Irmgard Baty do display human characteristics, 
Deckard has no scruples about killing them because he generally believes them 
to be a threat to humankind. The same cannot be said about the character of 
Luba Loft, however. In fact, of aIl the renegade androids Deckard has had to 
retire, Luba Loft is the one whose death disturbs Deckard the most. The reason 
for this is that she forces him to question the humanness of the androids and, 
more significantly, his own humanity. 
Prior to his encounter with Luba, Deckard views androids as "solitary 
predators" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 27) and firmly believes that they should 
be eliminated if the y deter from the purpose assigned to them by their human 
creators because in doing so they become a liability. The bounty hunter 
declares that "a humanoid robot is like any other machine; it can fluctuate 
between being a benefit and a hazard very rapidly" and that as benefit, the 
android does not pose a danger, and therefore should not need to be retired 
(Dick, Do Androids Dream 35). When Deckard initially meels Luba Loft, an 
android trying to pass as a human opera singer, he is "surprised at the quality of 
her voice", which he "[rates] with that of the best" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 
86) opera singers he had ever heard. Yet rather than recognize the ability to 
express her creativity through music as a human quality, Deckard sees Luba's 
talent as more reason to extinguish her life because it makes her too human: 
"Perhaps the better she functioned, the better a singer she is, the more 1 am 
needed. If the androids had remained substandard [ ... ] there would be no 
problem and no need of my ski]]" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 86-87). 
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Luba challenges Deckard in a way that no other android has before, 
questioning the concept of empathy as a defining factor of human versus non-
human identity. She confuses Deckard' s reading of the Voight-Kampff test and 
makes him doubt its accuracy by suggesting that he may be an android himself 
because of the lack of empathy he feels for his android victims. For example, 
when Deckard points out the fact that "an android doesn't care what happens to 
another android", Luba turns the tables on Deckard and cleverly responds "then 
you must be an android [ ... ] Because your job is to kiIl them, isn't it?" (Dick, 
Do Androids Dream 89). Consequently, of aIl the characters in Dick's novel, it 
is Luba who provides the most insight into the double standards of humans by 
confronting Deckard for judging individuals for their empathetic deficiency 
when he himself clearly lacks this quality. 
Through the character of Luba Loft, Dick asks one to consider this: if 
the concept of empathy involves one's ability to be aware of, relate to, and 
vicariously experience the feelings, thoughts and occurrences of others, then 
how can one expect androids to be empathetic when they are refused the 
opportunity to partake in human society and stripped of the right to evolve? 
The fact that humans pro gram their life span to less th an five years denies them 
the possibility of social development and, therefore, the androids are very 
limited in what the y learn and experience during their short existence. As a 
result, the y know very little about human empathy and are certain to fail the 
Voight -Kampff test. 
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This is evident when Deckard administers the test to Luba, as the 
android struggles to understand the bounty hunter' s questions and imitate an 
appropriate empathetic response. During the test, Luba attempts to hi de her 
lack of knowledge with respect to various terms referred to in Deckard's 
questioning, through the guise of semantic unfamiliarity. Ultimately, when 
Deckard begins to describe a social scenario that she is familiar with, she 
hastily interrupts with an answer, in a desperate attempt to show the bounty 
hunter that she understands. When Deckard snaps at her for answering 
prematurely what was in fact not the question, she bursts out in complete 
frustration: "But 1 understand that; why is a question 1 understand the wrong 
one? Aren't 1 supposed to understand?" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 92). The 
only thing separating the android from the human is the empathic faculty. The 
only determining factor of whether Luba will live or die is based on "thoughts" 
and "impulses" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 117), which she does not fully 
understand, nor is even given the opportunity and freedom to learn. She 
attempts to understand human empathy and mimic this ability, yet once her 
android status is confirmed, she realizes that it is useless to do so. No matter 
how hard she tries to play the part of the human, she will always be considered 
an inferior, inhuman being, simply "imitating [ ... ] a superior life form" (Dick, 
Do Androids Dream 117). 
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Furthermore, the fact that they are "born" into adulthood and deprived 
of the crucial developmental stages of childhood and adolescence makes the 
androids ignorant to many of life's experiences because they have not been 
exposed to many social situations, since their sole purpose is-not to evolve as 
aIl living creatures do but to serve as a human's slave. This is something that 
Luba understands, as is evident from her fixation with a painting of a young girl, 
namely Edvard Munch's Puberty: "[Luba] stood absorbed in the picture before 
her; a drawing of a young girl, hands clasped together, seated on the edge of a 
bed, an expression of bewildered wonder and new, groping awe imprinted on 
the face" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 115). It is clear that her fascination with 
this painting does not represent her interest in art as a means of mastering her 
imitation of a woman. Instead, the fact that she asks Deckard to buy a 
reproduction of the painting for her before he kills her, as if to grant her a dying 
wish, shows that it holds a sentimental value to her. The painting represents the 
experience of puberty, the transition from innocent child to sexually awakened 
woman, something that Luba never has the opportunity to experience. 
Initially, when Deckard offers to buy the original painting for her, Luba 
responds, "it's not for sale" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 115). Perhaps what 
Luba implies here is that she is resigned to the reality that she will never 
experience what it is like to grow, physically, mentally and emotionally, from a 
young girl to a woman, because such an experience is only reserved for humans. 
Ironically, the only way she can experience a sense ofpuberty is by acquiring a 
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copy of the painting, since she herself is a reproduction; the shadow of a human 
being, just like the shadow of the girl in Munch's painting. 
Even though Deckard knows that Luba is an artificial reproduction of a 
human being, he cannot shake the feeling that she is different from other 
androids; that she is somehow human. Her musical talent, her appreciation of 
art, her desire to exist and experience aIl the stages of human life, her apparent 
physical pain after being shot by Resch: these are aIl factors which affect 
Deckard and force him to question whether or not androids like Luba have 
souls (Dick, Do Androids Dream 118). Deckard's fascination with Luba's 
artistic talent recalls Walter Benjamin's argument that "mechanical 
reproduction of a work of art [ ... ] represents something new" (Benjamin 
1167). Through her act of imitating art, Luba establishes her own individuality 
by delivering a performance of Mozart's The Magic Flute that is so outstanding, 
it actually becomes an innovative work of art in itself which is worthy of 
reproduction. Yet even though he is enthralled by her voice and derives a sense 
of pleasure in hearing her sing, Deckard is also bothered by the fact that Luba 
may be more talented than many human opera singers. In his statement that 
"perhaps the better she functions, the better a singer she is, the more 1 am 
needed. If the androids had remained substandard, [ ... ] there would be no 
problem and no need of my skill" (Dick 86-87) Deckard displays the fear that 
androids will become superior to humans and will "shatter tradition" (Benjamin 
1170) by turning into the original objects of veneration while we will become 
their subordinate reproductions. 
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So far, 1 have listed several characters in Dick' s novel that display 
remarkable human attributes, which cloud our ability to distinguish between the 
human and the non-human. 1 now wish to explore the character of Rachael 
Rosen, who stands out from the rest because, unlike the renegade androids, she 
has been programmed to believe that she is a human being. Through the 
implantation of false memories, Rachael is designed by the Rosen Association 
as a means to disprove the accuracy of the Voight-Kampff test. By passing her 
off as an authentic human who fails the empathy test simply because she has 
spent most of her life on a space craft far from Earth, the Rosen Association 
would be able to argue that the test is ineffective and that it may have 
inadvertently caused the deaths of authentic human beings. When their plot 
fails, however, Eldon Rosen is forced to confess the truth to both Deckard and 
Rachael. Yet even after her true nature is revealed, it seems that Rachael 
continues to evolve on her own, as she experiences human emotions and 
impulses which make her appear "as human as any girl [Deckard] had known" 
(Dick, Do Androids Dream 172). She falls in love with Deckard and, as a 
result, begins to understand the concept of human empathy: "1 love you. If 1 
entered a room and found a sofa covered with your hide l' d score very high on 
the Voight-Kampff test" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 170). Rer feelings for 
Deckard seem to awaken a wide array of emotions, such as cheerfulness, 
melancholy, jealousy and spitefulness, none of which are present in any of the 
other androids in Dick's novel. These reactions, which occur spontaneously, 
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rather th an as the result of robotic programming, are very humanlike in nature 
and give rise to the possibility that androids can develop human emotions. 
In "The Android and the Ruman," Dick invites his audience to re-
evaluate and challenge past ideologies relating to humanism by asking 
themselves: 
What is it in our behavior that we can call specifically human? 
That is special to us as a living species? And what is it that, at 
least up to now, we can consign as merely machine behavior, or 
by extension, in sect behavior, or reflex behavior? (187) 
In doing so, Dick puts our perception of the human on trial in terms of its 
exclusion of other living entities by denying of the viability of su ch entities 
simply because they do not fit into our tradition al standards. Furthermore, in 
contemplating these issues, Dick seeks to demonstrate how the "machine 
behaviour" for which we denounce our mechanical constructs as artificial rather 
than authentic, is very often displayed in humans. Once again, this calls into 
question society' s notion of the "human," as it presents us with a situation 
where a human acts more like a machine than the machine itself. 
The very same questions raised in Dick's philosophical work are echoed 
in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? where one is confronted with the 
struggle to decide who is more human, Dick's biological or android characters. 
As seen in the present chapter, if one is to apply our tradition al definition of the 
human to sorne of the key android characters in Dick's novel, these mechanical 
beings do in fact possess striking human characteristics. That is, even if they 
cannot be classified as humans in the genetic sense, they nonetheless behave in 
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ways that are very human. Although one might not be inclined to question the 
authenticity of Dick's biological characters, on the grounds that the novel 
simply implies that they are humans, a deeper analysis reveals that these 
characters display very machine-like behavioural patterns. For example, in 
Dick's futuristic Earth, which has just been hit by World War Terminus, 
humans have become so emotionally detached from one another due to the 
considerable decrease of human life, that they rely on the "Penfield mood 
organ," a device used to "di al" moods, just to be able to feel and respond to a 
given situation. Raving said this, the questions that Dick brings up force one to 
challenge traditional beliefs about what makes us human and determine if we 
are actually qualified to claim that title for ourselves. 
One of the factors we rely on to distinguish humans from animais is that 
we view ourselves as free agents who have the capacity to decide or choose and 
who consequentiy act on such decisions or choices. The general belief is that, 
although animais share sorne of the characteristics as primitive humans, such as 
the instinct to survive, and perform similar actions, iike hunting for food, they 
are not free to act otherwise than the y do. While animaIs may act purposefully 
in certain situations, it is important to distinguish them from humans by 
understanding that it is their animalistic nature which drives them to behave 
that way. Il Rumans, on the other hand, have the capacity to reason, the 
Il In Free Will: A Very Short Introduction, Thomas Pink uses the shark as an example of the 
"unfreedom of animais." He argues that, just as we go to the super market in order to obtain 
food, the shark doubles back in order to catch a fish for the purpose of eating il. Yet, although 
both shark and human act with the purpose of acquiring something (ha( the y wanl, a shark's 
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freedom to make a choice about how they will act, and the ability to carry out a 
voluntary action in order to achieve a goal. 
If one applies the same the ory to machines, the fact that they perform 
tasks similar to humans does not necessarily mean that they have the freedom to 
choose their actions. Instead, one may argue that they do so because they have 
been programmed that way: 
[ ... ] to assign motive or purpose to them would be to enter the 
realm of paranoia; what machines do may resemble what we do, 
but certainly they do not have intent in the sense that we have; 
the y have tropisms, they have purpose in the sense that we build 
them to accomplish certain ends and to react to certain stimuli. 
A pistoI, for example, is built with the purpose of firing a metal 
slug that will damage, incapacitate, or kill someone, but this 
does not mean that the pistol wants to do this. (Dick, "The 
Android" 186) 
Dick recognizes that mechanical constructs are not in charge of their actions 
because we build them for specifie purposes and decide what it is that we 
expect them to do. Having sa id this, though, one must ask oneself whether or 
not humans are truly in control of their own destinies. Although we would like 
to believe that we are free to think, act and do as we like, there are so many 
things in our lives that we do not have control over that, as Dick suggests, "free 
will for us-that is, when we feel desire, when we are conscious of wanting to 
do what we do-may be even for us an illusion" ("The Android" 186). 
The concept of free will is one of the oldest and most complex 
philosophical debates known to humankind, as it is an issue which calls into 
purposiveness is the result of buill-in desires and instincts and not of a freedom to exercise 
control over ils actions. (Pink 22-23) 
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question whether or not we are truly in charge of our actions. The free will 
problem J2 stems from the uncertainty as to whether we are in fact free to decide 
our fates, or if how we choose to act is inevitable due to causal determinism, 
which Thomas Pink defines as follows: 
Causal determinism is the daim that everything that happens, 
induding our own actions, has already been causally determined 
to oœur. Everything that happens results from earlier causes -
causes that determine their effects by ensuring that these effects 
must oœur, leaving no chance for things to happen otherwise. 
So if causal determinism is true, th en at any time what will 
happen in the future is already entirely fixed and determined by 
the past. (Pink 13) 
In his work, Dick points out the fraudulence of our daim to be more 
authentically human than the android on the grounds of causal determinism. 
The author argues that we are not as free as we would like to believe; that our 
actions are not our own; that we are simply pawns to history and political ruIe, 
which have shaped us into the very robots we fear ("The Android" 187). 
Everything we think, feel, and do, is the result of our influence by "the false 
values, the false idoIs, the faise hates of the previous generations" and by the 
government that entraps us with ils slogans and ideologies, thus, reducing us to 
instruments of seemingly "good" abstract causes (Dick, "The Android" 188). If, 
then, the concept of free will is another important factor in distinguishing the 
i2 The free will problem deals with the issue of how we can truly claim to be in complete 
command of our actions when factors beyond our control, such as our historical pasts, the 
nature of the uni verse in which we live, and even many of our desires and feelings, clearly 
influence how we act. Pink argues thal there are two main philosophical positions relating to 
this problem, the tirst being Compatibilism, or the notion that freedom of action is consistent 
wilh causal determinism. The second position, Incompatibilism, deals with two schools of 
thought: Libertarianism, or the belief that we are totally free and that causal determinism is 
l'aise, or Scepticism, the idea that freedom Îs altogether impossible in that it is inconsistent both 
with causal determinism and causal indeterminism. (Pink 1-21) 
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human from the "non-human," how are we to explain that, Iike machines, our 
actions may be controlled by forces beyond our control? 
The lack of voluntary activity dispJayed by the novel's protagonist 
portrays humankind's Joss of free will and its replacement by submissive action 
instead. The character of Rick Deckard often cornes off as weak, passive, and 
Iacking in the qualities generally associated with a hero. Throughout the noveI, 
Deckard struggles with his society's conventional values, yet is not strong 
enough to turn his reasoning into a voluntary act of heroism. Even though he 
doubts the morality of his profession as a bounty hunter on numerous occasions, 
he still proceeds to retire each of the rebel androids because his government has 
"programmed" him to believe that they are his enemies. Consequently, what 
motivates Deckard to exterminate the androids does not result from his own 
willingness to kill, but rather from his belief that he is serving a "good,,13 
purpose in doing so. 
Although, subconsciousJy, Deckard is aware that the androids do not 
really pose a threat to his planet-that they are not here to usurp man but to live 
freely amongst men-the bounty hunter chooses to act as a follower rather than 
as the heroic leader that one would expect him to be as the novel' s protagonist. 
Rather than take a stand for truth, Deckard allows the government to use him as 
an instrument to do ils bidding, which it bases on false opportunistic values. 
This is what Dick refers to when he states that: 
13 Dick uses the word "good" derisively in "The Android and the Human," in his argument that 
society uses men as pawns to do their bidding by c1aiming that such actions are for a good 
cause. 
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[ ... ] although biologicallife continues, metabolism goes on, the 
soul-for lack of a better term-is no longer there, or is at least 
no longer active. And such does exist in our world-it always 
did, but the production of such inauthentic human activity has 
become a science of government and suchlike agencies now. 
(Dick, "The Android" 187) 
Deckard betrays his principles in order to do what his government expects of 
him, partly because he expects to be rewarded for his obedience by earning 
enough bounty money to buy himself a realliving goat. Yet at the end of the 
novel, his goat is murdered, suggesting that Deckard receives a less-than-heroic 
reward for the highly expensive price of his soul. 
Whereas Dick's protagonist fails as a hero, Roy Baty, the novel's 
antagonist, surprisingly exudes qualities which make it possible to consider the 
android as the actual hero in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? As David 
Desser argues: 
Batty' s heroism is of a richer mythical nature as he becomes a 
true questing hero, one who is on a metaphysical as weIl as 
literaI search, whereas, on one level, Deckard is merely a man 
doing a job [ ... ] And while both Batty and Deckard undertake 
'missions,' Batty's mission is the more emotionaIly satisfying 
one for the audience. (55) 
Not only does Baty possess the strength and courage missing in Deckard, but 
his actions often rise above what humans believe to be the shortcomings of 
androids, implying that the latter may be more human than the former think. 
Though Deckard faUs short of engaging in any real voluntary endeavour/ 4 Baty 
assigns a purpose to his existence (to prove that android life is sacred), makes a 
14 Even when he is intimate with Rachael Rosen, it is only after she orders him to "take off [his] 
coat ... so [they] can go to bed." (Dick, Do Androids Dreal11 167) 
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decision (formulates a plan to gather a group of androids and convince them to 
escape from Mars), and takes voluntary action in order to achieve his desired 
goal (flees to Earth); all factors which lead to the suggestion that at least sorne 
androids are capable of exercising free will. Furthermore, unlike Deckard, Baty 
exhibits strong leadership skills and possesses the strength to rebel against the 
forces that bind him, both of which are admirable human qualities believed to 
be missing in androids; and not to mention, both of which place him in the 
same ranks as other archetypal heroes which we have come across in human 
history. 
In John Milton's Paradise Lost, Satan has been considered by sorne 
to be the true hero of the epic poem. The rebeIlious angel is admired for his 
strength and bravery, even if his efforts prove to be futile and his mission a 
failure. As Desser argues: 
The place of Satan in Paradise Lost has given rise to an 
important textual issue revolving around the question of who is 
the real hero of the narrative. Milton's intentions are clear on 
this point, namely that Adam is the hero, but the text's intentions 
seem less clear. The possibility of reading Satan as the hero is 
very real. Satan can be seen as the ultimate rebel who begins as 
God's brightest angel and who faIls ignominiously into the 
depths of Hell. By the standards of classical tragedy, Satan is 
the ultimate tragic hero. The Romantics, of course, especially 
B yron and the Shelleys, found in Satan the real hero of Milton' s 
epic. Even Milton himself introduces the possibility of reading 
Satan as the hero not only by the standards of classical tragedy 
(with which Milton was intimately familiar, needless to say) but 
through the amount of time devoted to Satan. (55) 
As in Paradise Lost, Dick may also intend for Deckard to be the novel's hero; 
however, one cannot ignore the fact that Baty exerts a certain presence and 
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passion that commands attention. In fact, when he is first introduced in Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? he is described as "large," "intelligent," 
"sombre," and "brutal," with "bright eyes" (Dick 134). Compared with 
MiIton's depiction of Satan as "huge in length" (i. 209), "darkened so, yet 
shone above them all" (i. 598-599) "of dauntless courage" (i. 603), and "with 
eyes that sparkling blazed" (PL i. 193-194) there is Iittle dou bt that Baty can be 
associated with the fallen angel/hero. The possibility of an android hero, in a 
novel where androids are viewed as incapable of any authentic actions, 
emotions and leadership qualities, is striking because it implies that, like the 
concept of the "human," things are not always either black or white. 
Sometimes one must find a grey zone in order to discover a new reality; one 
which considers the androids' humanness and treats them as authentic beings 
rather than as villainous fakes. 
What is even more fascinating about Desser's analysis of Roy Baty is 
that, in addition to his association of Baty as Satan, Desser recognizes certain 
Adamic qualities in the android as weIl: "Batty, like Adam, was created by God 
(Tyrell)15 to live in Eden [ ... ] But Batty has questions about his life and so he 
seeks answers, tasting the forbidden fruit, the fruit of Earth" (55). Considering 
the similarities between Baty and Adam, the former could very well be 
interpreted as a representation of the latter, which would raise Baty's hero 
status on a much higher level, as he would be perceived as the android whose 
"fall" leads to the evolution of all future androids: 
15 "Tyrell" refers to "Tyrell Corp.," the film version of the Rosen Association. 
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Before the Fall, Man is without sin, but he is also without 
knowledge, without true love, for he must experience love's 
opposites to appreciate fully its blessings. This is to say that 
Man in Eden is not really yet Man; thus the Fall is somehow 
fortunate, for now Man has a choice in his acceptance of God, in 
his pursuit of knowledge. (Desser 56) 
Adam's FaU is often celebrated because of the belief that it was necessary in 
order for future generations of humans to fully appreciate ail of life' s wonders, 
su ch as the glory of God, truth, freedom, knowledge, and love, and grow as 
intelligent beings rather th an mindless subjects. If one would grant the same 
consideration to Baty, one might be înclined to argue that leading up to his 
"faU," Baty is simply a being trying to come to terms with his existence. By the 
time Deckard finds him, Baty has succeeded in leading, learning, and loving; aU 
considered human acts. At the time of his "faU," Baty has become a man; 
however, he is not afforded the same possibility of redemption like Adam. In 
Baty's case, there is only the promise of death. Because the novel ends on an 
optimistic note, however, one must consider that Baty's death is not in vain. 
When Iran informs Deckard that the toad he found in the desert is actually 
electrical, rather than be disappointed, Deckard responds that he prefers to 
know the truth rather than be deceived. His response to Iran that "the electric 
things have their lives, too" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 214) indicates 
Deckard's evolution from an individu al who blîndly accepted whatever 
ideologies his society fed him, to a man who finally recognizes the sentience in 
others. Having said this, Baty's faH can be read as the rise of a new type of 
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android race that wil1 final1y be acknowledged as human and share the same 
rights and freedoms as humans. 
In a world of constant evolution, where old species are dying and new 
ones are emerging, it no Jonger makes sense ta limit what we perceive as 
human attributes ta human beings aJone. CJearJy, there are other entities in our 
environment that think, feel and act like us, and the fact that they may not meet 
our aH of the criteria by which we define the human does not mean that they are 
ta be entirely dismissed as such. The fact remains that our traditional definition 
of what it means ta be human should not be read as a bJueprint. There 1S still sa 
much about the universe in which we live that we do not understand. For 
example, how are we ta truly ascertain the fact that animais do not possess the 
freedom of voluntary action when sorne animaIs, such as chimpanzees and 
dolphins, have been found ta display higher levels of intelligence in comparison 
ta other animais? If in fact they do have the capacity of rational thinking and 
the freedom of choice and action, have these animaIs not eamed the right ta be 
considered as human, deserving of the same rights as US?16 Definitions are 
16 Although sorne may argue that even the most sophisticated of animaIs are not intelligent 
enough to exercise the capacity for free will, we do not yet know enough about such animaIs, 
scientifically speaking, to dis miss the possibility that they may deserve to be considered human. 
Marilyn Gwaltney argues: 
... intelligence is to be respected wherever it is found. Intelligent beings, of 
course, are the rational, self-conscious, purposive beings we have described 
as persons. 
But extending personhood to the non-human or the unconventionally human 
is no longer an activity that should be confined lo the art of the science fiction 
writer; il must be seriously contemplated by scientists and lay persons in 
respect to any endeavor dealing with consciousness. If chimpanzees, gorillas, 
dolphins, whales, etc. meet the criteria of personness to the same degree as 
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necessary in society because the y answer many of our questions and allow us to 
establish a collective understanding amongst each other; however, as evolution 
occurs, definitions should be revised accordingly, rather be permanently set in 
stone. As Dylan Evans argues: 
Definitions are useful for resolving disputes, but they cao easily 
become intellectual straitjackets, tempting people into the 
mistakeo belief that words have fixed or essential meanings that 
should be defended against the tide of cultural change and 
scientific progress. (101) 
To adopt our traditiooal definition of the human as a blueprint is to discriininate 
against and objectif y everything else that does not fall under that definition. 
Consequently, in viewing other things and people in this world as objects rather 
than subjects, we lose the very thing we are tryiog so hard to protect-our 
humanness. 
Even within the confines of our conventional humanistic philosophy, 1 
have demonstrated how each of Dick's androids possesses many qualities 
which give them the right to be called human; still, the biological humans in 
Dick's novel refuse to acknowledge the humanness of their artificial constructs. 
The reason for this is the perception that androids lack human consciousness; 
sorne humans, why should they not be extended the same moral and legal 
rights? Or conversely, if we den y such moral and legal rights to highly 
intelligent animaIs, why should we not deny them to sorne types of 
humans? ... Animal behaviorists and medical researchers using animais 
must consider whether their subjects mighl meet the criteria for personhood. 
If they think they might me et lhose criteria. then they must either stop their 
research or proceed as though they were dealing with human subjects. 
(Gwaltney,38) 
Thus, if evidence leads us to fact that sorne non-humans possess an intelligence that could very 
weil be interpreted as human, our traditional perception of personhood (which Gwaltney uses 
interchangeably with the "human") should be extended to include such non-human beings. 
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the belief that a human body without a human mind simply cannot be called 
human. However, modern sciences such as cybernetics, artificial intelligence 
and virtual reality, give rise to the possibility that consciousness can be 
disembodied and transposed onto a separate location without change (Hayles 1). 
Consequently, this forces us to revise our humanistic views in favour of a new 
type of philosophy: that of the posthuman. 
N. Katherine Hayles argues that the posthuman takes shape through 
three interconnected concepts: (a) the notion that "information lost its body," (b) 
the "cyborg," which "was created as a technological artefact and cultural icon 
in the years following World War II; and (c) the idea that our historic 
assessment of the human is "giving way to a different construction called the 
posthuman" (2). In Hayles' theory, information, which the author identifies as 
human consciousness, is no longer attached to the human body and is instead 
viewed as an element which can be displaced onto other entities without losing 
its effect. Dick's representation of false memory implantation depicts such a 
transfer of human consciousness, which makes it easier to consider the androids 
as human. Next, the cyborg can be viewed as the "informational pathway 
connecting the organic body to its prosthetic extensions" (2). Such a figure is 
represented through Dick's portrayal of the "organic" (Dick, Do Androids 
Dream 173) android, a literaI embodiment of the "union of the human with the 
intelligent machine" (Hayles 2) that is central in the expression of the 
posthuman. Finally, the view that our historical consideration of the human is 
being reworked into the posthuman involves the discarding of the "1", or 
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'''natural' self' (3) in favour of the "we," or a self that is the product of the 
collective collaboration between human and machine. This communal merging 
for the purpose of establishing a common sense of self can be seen through 
Dick's portrayal of Mercerism. Hayles helps us to understand this by arguing: 
The moment a human grasps the empathy box, his consciousness 
fuses with that of unknown and unnamed others. He is both 
alone and in company, cut off from his surroundings and in 
emotional communication with other human beings [ ... ] The 
empathy box interpolates the private delusions of the subject into 
a shared ideology that inscribe his characteristic experiences into 
scripts invested with religious, political, and social significance 
(177). 
Thus, Mercerism is a form of expression between the human and the android, or 
alien other, wherein the two entities can share various ideologies of social and 
cultural importance and formulate a common posthuman identity. 
As 1 have demonstrated by embedding examples from Dick's text into 
Hayles' definition, the shift from humanism to posthumanism is something that 
is represented in the novel. In the form of a subtextual answer to the complex 
question of what constitutes a human, Dick caUs for Hayles' reworking of our 
traditional views in order to correspond to modern-day sciences, such as 
cybernetics, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality. Although su ch sciences 
have been termed as "antihuman" and "apocalyptic" (Hayles 288), they should 
in fact be revered for the "smarter environments" (289) which the y help to 
construct. Humans look to their artificial constructs as a means to better their 
lives. And, machines are created and programmed by humans. Both species 
depend on one another for sustenance. Thus, rather than fear the non-human, 
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Dick' s novel asserts that we should embrace the posthuman, a merging of the 
organic and artificial in order to assure a "long-range survival of humans and of 
the other life-forms [ ... ] with whom we share the planet and ourselves" 
(Hayles 291). 
Chapter Three 
The "Selr' and the "Double" 
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In exploring the question of what it is that makes us human, the concept 
of consciousness cornes into play as an important distinction between ourselves 
and our mechanical counterparts. As 1 argued in the previous chapter, our 
beHef that robots cannot engage in the same thoughts, perceptions, sensations 
and emotions as us serves as a boundary marker, dividing human and machine. 
The issue of whether non-humans can develop consciousness is the subject of 
controversy, as it raises the question of how the presence of consciousness can 
be assessed in certain classes of humans, such as in young children and the 
mentally-ill. In the present chapter, 1 wish to examine whether Dick's androids 
possess individual consciousness and, if so, to what extent. Furthermore, in 
studying the nature of the "self," 1 will draw on the psychoanalytical theory of 
the Double, in order to demonstrate how Dick's androids represent certain 
aspects of ourselves, which further highlights the possibility that they are 
human. 
In general, the terms "human," "person," and "self' can be used 
interchangeably because oftheir synonymous meaning; however, as Marilyn 
Gwaltney argues, "that synonyrnity does not necessarily hold if androids like 
those in [Dick's] novel exist" (33). Although the androids are almost identical 
to human beings, the latter do not accept the personhood of the former. Instead, 
they dismiss any indication of individual consciousness as the resuIt of 
technological programming. According to Gwaltney, the humans in Dick's 
novel expect the androids "to meet certain functional criteria before being 
declared to be a person or to have a self' (33). In order to determine what this 
criterion consists of and decide whether or not Dick's androids qualify as 
persons, 1 will draw on Gwaltney's article, "Androids as a Device for 
Reflection on Personhood," which offers a li st of prerequisites with respect to 
what we typically define as a person. 
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Before one resolves whether Dick's androids possess a self, one must 
determine what it actually means to be a person. According to Gwaltney, the 
first characteristic of personhood that cornes to mind, in a traditional Western 
context, is the possession of a soul. The author argues that the general view of 
the self is "that it is the non-material substance that gives continuity and reality 
to individual human personality. That is, it is the soul" (34). The notion that 
the soul is the foundation of self, which transcends the body and continues to 
exist, even after death, is widely believed; yet most modern philosophers and 
psychologists agree that there is no concrete evidence to support the idea of self 
as metaphysical matter. Consequently, if there is no way of knowing if the self 
consists of an immortal soul, then how can this be considered a defining factor 
of the androids' personhood? Even with this in mind, however, society 
continues to view the soul as an integral part of the self. In fact, it is viewed in 
spiritual terms as the very essence of a person. Without it, we are simply 
bodies without life; much like what the humans in Dick's novel consider the 
androids to be. 
Other prerequisites of what constitute a person are rationality and one's 
self-consciousness. 1 have shown, in the previous chapter, how humans possess 
the ability to set a goal and act for the purpose of achieving that goal. In Dick's 
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novel, ev en though humans program the androids to carry out hard labour in 
their place, the fact that they are able to fulfiIl their purpose demonstrates that 
the androids are in fact able to act purposefully. Gwaltney argues that, "to act 
in such situations, the androids must be able to think like human beings, not 
like today's computers with aIl possible decisions programmed but as self-
regulating, self-correcting beings" (35). Thus, the fact that the androids act 
autonomously with the purpose of completing their tasks strongly suggests that 
they meet this principle of personhood. 
The final criterion listed as a determining factor in what may be 
considered as a person, or self, is the freedom to choose one's pursuits. 
Gwaltney argues that being a person "means having an awareness of being an 
identity over time, an identity that can act to achieve a variety of ends or goals, 
and that, furthermore, can choose among that variety of goals" (35). The very 
fact that Dick's renegade androids "choose" to have a better life, they "choose" 
to flee to Earth, that sorne of them even "choose" careers for themselves (i.e. 
Luba Loft as opera singer, Buster Friendly as TV personality, Garland as police 
officer, Max Polokov as "chickenhead" garbage coIlector and also as WPO 
Soviet officer) and live among humans, clearly indicates that sorne of the 
androids aIready possess this criterion. 1 say "sorne" because not aIl of Dick' s 
android characters share the same self-determination. For example, contrary to 
Gwaltney's argument that Rachael Rosen displays the greatest sense of self and 
freedom of choice, it seems that Rachael sometimes acts more like an android 
"serving" a purpose rather th an "choosing" one; for although Rachael 
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"chooses" to help Deckard by providing him with a weapon to kill the renegade 
androids and she later "chooses" to murder his goat, the fact that she is under 
the control of the Rosen Association (who order her to seduce Deckard for the 
purpose of rendering him incapable of retiring another android) indicates that 
she is neither in control of her own actions, nor free to choose her own destiny. 
Instead, Roy Baty can be read as the character who exhibits the greatest sense 
of self because he recognizes his individuality, his right to be free and to live a 
fulfilling life. Furthermore, Baty chooses to assert those rights by taking an 
active role and carrying out a plan to gather his android companions and flee to 
Earth in search of a better future. 
Based on these principles of personhood, it is clear that the that androids 
in Dick's novel can be regarded as individuals; however, their lack of empathy 
and the fact that they have "skipped" infancy, childhood and adolescence, aIl 
crucial stages in the development of the human self, renders them as incomplete 
persons, somehow "defective" or "not quite right" (Gwaltney 35). 
Consequently, this brings forth the question of wh ether or not the self is 
developmental and, if so, whether Dick's androids can only become persons 
through acquired knowledge and experience. AIso, the androids' 
developmental deficiencies raise the moral dilemma surrounding the type of 
pers on society would generate, if it actually succeeded in bypassing the stages 
of human development and created an adult, fully-grown at the time of his/her 
"birth." According to Gwaltney, su ch an individual wou Id possess "aIl the 
intellectual, emotional, and physical capacities of an adult human being but 
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with no experience in learning how to use those capacities" (36). What 
Gwaltney describes here is a being who, like a toddler, has little understanding 
about the environment and the people surrounding it; someone who has not 
gone through the normal developmental stages of the average person's life; who 
lacks the ability to rationalize and be empathetic towards others. Though 
Gwaltney labels Dick's androids as an "interesting thought experiment" (36) in 
terms of the consequences of the creation of an artificially-produced adult, such. 
an ex periment is not new to the field of science fiction, as other authors have 
dealt with the issue in the pasto 
The image that Gwaltney uses to describe the frame of mind of a man-
made being like the ones depicted in Dick's novel is that of an immature child 
trapped in an aduIt's body. The author argues that: 
Such a being would, of course, be potentially self-reflective, and 
would, in a relatively short period of time, become aware of the 
absence of useful necessary knowledge and experience, just as 
the human child does. No one expects a toddler to have empathy. 
He is too socially inexperienced. Neither does one expect a 
toddler to have control over murderous emotions. But as the 
child grows in experience, she gains in empathy and self-control. 
(36) 
Gwaltney's description depicts the frustration that would arise from the being's 
eventual realization that he/she is intellectually and socially "deformed" in 
comparison with human beings. As Gwaltney argues, no one expects a child to 
display a sense of empathy, or have control over their feelings. Yet, we do 
expect the child to eventually grow out of their immature state into adulthood. 
Because of their short lifespan, the androids are not granted the same 
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opportunity to mature and improve themselves as persons. As a result, humans 
view the androids as "unnatural," even though, essentially, they are the ones 
responsible for building them this way; and the androids view themselves as 
"incomplete" persons, as they are aware of their "potentiality for knowledge 
and accomplishment" (Gwaltney 36), yet also conscious that the y will not be in 
existence long enough to live out their aspirations. 
Gwaltney's image of "the frustrated rage of a child expressed in the 
body of an adult" (36) also calls to mind another familiar figure, namely, that of 
the creature in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Shortly after the creature in 
Shelley's novel is born, he is abandoned by his creator and left utterly alone. 
Like a young child, he is inexperienced, bewildered, and completely unaware of 
the harsh society that awaits him. Through the experience he acquires while 
trying to fend for himself-and by experience 1 refer to the creature's learning 
of basic survival and language skills-he becomes aware of his social exclusion 
and develops feelings of bitterness and hatred towards humankind. 
Anne McWhir explores the social effects of education in Frankenstein, 
by arguing that the creature "is trapped in the abyss between the ideology his 
education teaches and his own experience of a rejecting world" (73). The 
creature constructs his sense of self through books such as Paradise Lost, which 
he reads as true history and bases himself on, only to face the harsh reality that 
"their lessons have formed him for a world that will not accept him" (McWhir 
74). He believes that by acquiring knowledge of language, he will attain the 
power to alter his miserable situation by proving that he too is as "competent as 
natural man" (McWhir79); yet he realizes all to quickly that his education 
offers him no recourse against a society which refuses to look beyond his 
physical deformity and recognize his personhood. 
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To tie this together with Dick' s novel, the androids are designed to look, 
think and act like humans and are programmed to replace us in specific 
laborious tasks. They are expected to be our exact replicates without 
overstepping their boundaries by claiming authentic humanness or the 
possession of a self. It is a frustrating message that humankind sends to these 
beings: that the y are good enough to pass as humans and do their "dirty work," 
yet they do not deserve to be viewed as persons. The Nexus-6 type androids 
are even portrayed as being intellectually superior to human beings; yet, like 
Shelley's creature, this does not earn them any respect or self-worth in society. 
Instead, the human race views them as objects, not persons. 
But what if the androids were already programmed with the maturity of 
an average human adult and implanted with an artificial human consciousness 
which would make them believe that they experienced the developmental stages 
of infancy, childhood and adolescence? Would such a being be deemed a 
person? Would the y consider themselves to be a person? As argued earlier in 
my chapter, Dick's androids are perceived as defective persons by the society in 
which they dwell. Yet there is one android, the character of Rachael Rosen, 
that is different than the rest; that seems more normal, more complete; like an 
actual person. The reason Rachael appears more human than the rest is because 
she is given false memories in order to believe that she is actually human. This 
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accounts for her sense of self and the reason others see her as an authentic 
person, rather than an imitation. 
Once Rachaellearns that she is in fact an android, however, her sense of 
self is threatened and she begins to question the nature of her existence and 
individuality. As a consequence, Rachael undergoes what Gwaltney terms as 
"one of the most painful of human experiences: an identity crisis" (32). The 
fact that Rachael is caught between what she has been programmed to believe 
and the know ledge of her true state makes it difficult for Rachel to figure out 
where she stands as a person. For example, lin her discussion with Deckard 
about Pris, her android double, Rachael identifies with both her human and 
android nature: 
You know what 1 have? Toward this Pris android [ ... ] 
Something like [empathy] [ ... ] Identification [ ... ] We are 
machines, stamped out like bottle caps. Il' s an illusion that 1-1 
personally-really exist; l'm just a representation of a type. 
(Dick, Do Androids Dream 165) 
Rachael identifies with Pris, which indicates that she is capable of displaying 
empathy; yet she immediately reduces her authentic human behaviour to a mere 
illusion produced by mechanical programming. The whole scenario plays out 
like a struggle between two selves, as Rachael is tom between her perception of 
herself as a unique human being and as one of countless identical Nexus-6s. 
She attemps to come to terms with her identity as an android; however, her 
human side interferes: 
Androids can't bear children. Is that a loss? Is it a loss? 1 don't 
really know; 1 have no way to tell. How does it feel to have a 
child? How does it feel to be born, for that matter? We're not 
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born; we don't grow up; in ste ad of dying from illness or old age 
we wear out like ants. Ants again; that's what we are. Not you; 
1 mean me. Chitinous reflex-machines who aren't really alive. 
l'm not alive! (Dick, Do Androids Dream 169) 
When she thinks of aIl the things she will ne ver get to experience, like 
motherhood, illness, old age and death, Rachael feels a sense of loss. Each of 
the se factors represent the possibilities that were attached to her human self, 
which have now been stripped from her because she is no longer considered to 
be alive by human society. Her distress at the realization that she is not a 
unique person but a copy of many identical androids reflects her desire for 
individualism. And su ch a need for an authentic self depicts yet another 
example of the androids' potential for consciousness and shows how, as Dick' s 
title suggests, androids "dream" about being persons. 
Having demonstrated how Dick's androids can be considered as 
individuals, 1 now wish to shift my focus onto the study of the android as a 
literary motif of the double, or Doppelganger, and its relationship to 
personhood in terms of mirror image, opposing self, and fragmentation of a 
single mind. Each of the se factors offers invaluable insight on the history of the 
Doppelganger, its literary function, and the questions that su ch a figure raises 
about authentic versus false identity. 1 will not only show how many of the 
main characters in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? act as doubles of one 
another, but will also establish an intertextuallink between Dick's characters 
and those of Frankenstein and Paradise Lost, who 1 will argue function as 
doubles of each other. This doubling of monumentalliterary figures is 
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important, as it clearly displays the influence of the predecessor artists on Dick 
and rematerializes sorne of the primitive anxieties dealt with in the former texts. 
More importantly, Dick's seemingly endless doubles and the constant 
questioning of the reality of one's identity create what Sigmund Freud describes 
as an "uncanny" setting, where the familiar actually transfigures into the 
unfamiliar, the disconcerting, and the terrifying. 
One of the most interesting aspects of Dick's fiction-and not to 
mention the most critiqued-is his use of the android as literary device in order 
to portray one of the oidest figures known to literature: the Double, or 
Doppelgiinger. Using the myth of Echo and Narcissus, C. Keppler describes 
an early instance of the Double, that of Narcissus's reflection in the fountain. 
Although such an image may not incite the same intrigue as it does when we 
are children, the figure of the Double still holds a sense of mystery with respect 
to its relationship to the original self: 
Today things like reflected sound waves or light waves are no 
longer the mysteries they were for us in our childhood, or for 
adults in the cultural childhood that produced such stories as that 
of Echo and Narcissus. Nevertheless, in one form at least the 
mystery of simultaneous unit y and duality has lived on, and 
remains as mysterious as ever. (2) 
Thus, what is mysterious about the Double is no longer the fact that it serves as 
a mirror reflection of one' s self but that it is not necessaril y an exact physical 
and psychological duplication of the original self; that it is instead both united 
with and separated from the original self. And it is this sense of intrigue that 
has made the Double one of the oldest known literary figures. 
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The age-old figure of the double is described by Keppler as 
follows: 
This is a figure which has appeared repeatedly 
throughout the creative literature of the world, best 
known by his German name Doppelgiinger, or in 
English-speaking countries by the name 'Double.' His 
appearances have been sporadic, but they have been on 
the whole extraordinarily frequent, dating from 
beginnings so early that we must guess at their antiquity, 
and continuing up to the present day. Furthermore, while 
as an impossible blender of opposites he is of course a 
fantasy, his role has not (as is often supposed) been that 
of a crude spine-chiller like the spectres of Gothie 
Romance; he is far too difficult and demanding a figure, 
demanding of both writer and reader, to be included for a 
cheap thrill. He has played his part in sorne of the 
greatest works by sorne of the greatest authors and 
aImost never has this been a minor part, for there is 
something about him, for good or ill, that makes him 
tend to dominate whatever the situation he is placed in. 
Strange he is bound to be: a figure of the shadowy 
unknown, retaining in his most benign aspects sorne of 
the uncanniness of shadow land. Yet he is neither a mere 
trick nor a mere convention; on the contrary, from the 
persistence of his appearances he would seem to be a 
product of very considerable importance to the writers of 
world literature; he wou Id seem, in other words, to have 
his roots deeply fastened in the soi! of human thought 
and experience. (2) 
Keppler's description is particularly useful in analyzing Dick's work because it 
encompasses aU that Dick conveys through his portrayal of the androids. First 
and forernost, the fact that even though Dick's novel is set in the future, using 
the androids as Doubles is a therne borrowed from past authors, like Mary 
Shelley and John Milton, in order to revisit certain anxieties expressed by his 
predecessors. Furthermore, although the androids are Doubles of ourselves, 
they possess a sense of "the shadowy unknown," which upsets our sense of 
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normalcy and excites feelings of fear, repulsion and/or distress, which Freud 
caUs unheimlich, or uncanny (Freud 930). In addition, the androids do in fact 
play a major role in the novel, as it is through them that Dick catalogues his 
most important ideologies and concerns about the nature of our humanness. 
The android as Doppelgiinger in Dick's noveI represents the resurfacing 
repressed anxieties stemming from the past, mostly relating to humankind's 
age-old questions about our relationship with the uni verse and with God, which 
then transfigure into the uncanny.17 According to psychoanalyst Sigmund 
Freud, the most prominent themes of uncanniness are aU concerned with the 
phenomenon known as the Double: a character that is considered as identical to 
someone else because of the indistinguishable physical characteristics they 
share with that person. This relation, Freud argues, is highlighted by mental 
processes where: a) both the original self and the Double share the same 
emotions, knowledge, and experience; b) the Doppelgiinger divides itself from 
the original self and interchanges its personhood with that of someone else, who 
it better identifies with; c) there is a constant "repetition of the same features or 
character-traits or vicissitudes, of the same crimes, or even the same names, 
through several consecutive generations" (940). Whatever the case may be, the 
quality of uncanniness cornes from the fact that the Double originates from an 
11 Given the complexity of defining a concept that, in sorne languages, does not even exist as a 
word, Freud uses two approaches to study of the "uncanny": 1) the etymological history of the 
word in various languages and 2) the listing of persons, things, sense-impressions, experiences 
and situations which arouse in us the feeling of uncanniness, and then determining the unknown 
nature of the uncanny based on the common factors shared in each such examples. Freud 
argues that both approaches come to the same conclusion, that: "the uncanny is that cJass of the 
frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar." (Freud 930) 
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infantile stage, when it is seen as an unthreatening aspect, and subsequently 
develops into a thing of terror in one's adult years. 18 Let us consider the 
concept of the soul, which Freud refers to as man's first Double, as an example. 
The immortal soul reflects our once primitive and childhood stage of 
uninhibited self-love, resulting in our desire to transcend the finality of the 
death and live eternally. We once believed that the soul was a Double of the 
body in that when the body dies, the soul offers a comforting assurance of 
immortality. As time passed, however, and people began to lose faith in the 
concept of the immortal soul, the return of our earlier fears forced us to view 
the figure of the double as the uncanny reminder of our inevitable mortality. 
Going back to the mental processes mentioned by Freud, which are 
projected by the figure of the double, 1 now wish to demonstrate how the 
androids in Dick's novel reflect each of these, namely: the double as mirror 
image, as a fragment of a single self, and as other or opposite self. Furthermore, 
1 will argue that Dick's androids clearly display many of the same qualities as 
past doubles in literature-and more specifically-the characters of Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein, who act as doubles of Milton's characters in Paradise 
Lost. Consequently, this intertextuallink between characters does exactIy what 
Freud argues in that it forces the return of past fears, which although we are 
able to repress temporarily, re-emerge to haunt us. 
18 An ex ample that Freud uses is one's childhood wish for our dolls to come alive, which is at 
that stage considered a pleasant thought, yet a very frightening our adult years (Freud, 941). 
91 
In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? the figure of the android as 
man's mirror image reflects man's primitive feeling of self-love, as weIl as the 
eeriness that follows when one actually encounters one's Double. Like the 
mythological figure of Narcissus, Man is in love with himself, in the sense that 
he believes that he is beautiful and unique in the universe. This concept of 
human narcissism is one that has been represented in science fiction and treated 
as something that turns into an obsession: Man's need to create a perfect 
reproduction of himself. This stems from the belief that, having been created in 
God's image, Man deserves the same godly rights and privileges as his Creator. 
In Frankenstein, Victor expresses this belief in his aspiration to create 
"a new species [that] would bless [him] as its creator and source" and "would 
owe their being to [him]" (Shelley 32). His goal is to be like God and create a 
being as "complex and wonderful as man" (31); yet when he cornes across his 
creation for the first time, Victor is horrified by the results: 
How can 1 describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how 
delineate the wretch whom with su ch infinite pains and care 1 
had endeavoured to form? His limbs were in proportion, and 1 
had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful !-Great God! 
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and 
arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; 
his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only 
formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed 
almost of the same col our as the dun white sockets in which the y 
were set, his shrivelled complexion, and 'straight black lips. (34) 
Unlike Dick's androids, which are exact duplicates of human beings, Victor's 
creature cannot be seen as Victor's double in the literaI sense. Metaphorically 
speaking, however, the creature can be read as his creator's mirror image. The 
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exaggerated hideousness portrayed by Shelley highlights Victor's inability to 
recognize himself in his creature's reflection because it portrays aIl that is 
"ugly" in Man. Consequently, Victor subconsciously refuses to see his creature 
as an image of himself because to do so wou Id me an to recognize that he is just 
as monstrous. 
Similarly, the humans in Dick's novel set out to construct a being 
virtually identical to themselves, yet when they succeed in doing so, the y 
categorize them as "unnatural phenomena" (Francavilla 9) to be feared and 
enslaved, rather th an acknowledged as a new class of human species. The 
Rosen Association cornes so close to creating the perfect replicate of Man that, 
as Joseph Francavilla argues, "the contrast and oppositions between the human 
and the android becomes blurred" and "the contrasting characteristics of each 
life form switch sides" (9). Thus, as the android becomes more animate and the 
human more inanimate, there is a sense of "intellectual uncertainty" (Freud 937) 
as to which entity is alive and which is not. This intellectual uncertainty 
translates into a feeling of uncanniness, where the familiar-all that we know 
about humanness-transforms into the unfarniliar, leaving one to feel a sense of 
confusion and dread. 
The psychoanalytic concept of intellectual uncertainty is central to 
Dick's novel, as there is a constant questioning of which is the "authentic" self 
and which the "replica." In fact, the use of doubles within the novel is so 
exhaustive that one can write an en tire paper arguing how each character serves 
as a mirror image of another, in order for Dick to confuse his audience by 
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blurring the line between the android and the human. It is not my intent to 
embark on such an exhaustive analysis, however, therefore 1 willlimit my study 
to only a few examples of the Doubles depicted in the novel and discuss the 
way in which it represents the intellectual uncertainty referred to by Freud. 
In the scene where he is arrested and taken to an alternate police 
department which he has never heard of, Deckard encounters his mirror-image 
Double, another bounty hunter by the name of Phil Resch. The uncanny 
sirnilarity of the police department where he is being detained and his own 
causes Deckard to question which reality is authentic: his own, or the one 
taking place in this other police department. His confusion is only heightened 
with the introduction of Phil Resch, who is also in the business of executing 
androids. When confronted with the problem of being unable to distinguish 
who se life is an inauthentic reality, Deckard and Resch begin to question which 
of them has been implanted with a "false memory system" (Dick, Do Androids 
Dream 111), something that the manufacturers of the androids create which 
makes the androids believe that they are human. Either one of them could be 
an android yet-initially-neither recognizes themselves as such. Neil 
Easterbrook refers to this as the "conceit of doubling-authentic doubles [that] 
do not recognize themselves as double" (27). It is only when Resch suspects 
that Deckard is keeping a secret from him-that Garland may have told 
Deckard that Resch is an android-that Resch begins to contemplate the idea 
that he may not be human. 
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Even though Deckard and Resch are not identical to each other, their 
resemblance in character and shared life experiences render them as mirror 
images of one another. Neil Easterbrook con tends that "Phil Resch serves as 
Deckard's mirror image, especially to provoke his own doubts about his status 
and personal identity, for he becomes 'alien' even to himself' (27). In 
considering Easterbrook' s argument, one may argue that the fact that Resch is 
Deckard's mirror image is suggestive that, in the midst of Resch's identity 
crisis, Deckard finds himself in the same predicament. Deckard is disgusted 
with the cold brutality with which Resch assassinates the androids and 
determines that Resch must be an android himself because of his lack of 
empathy. When Deckard administers the Voight-Kampfftest and it turns out 
that Resch is in fact human, Deckard is thrown off balance. His faith in 
empathy as an innately human trait, in his profession, and in the very nature of 
his existence, is called into question. He insists on administering the test to 
himself in order to satisfy his own intellectual uncertainty as to the authenticity 
of his human existence. 
In a novel permeated by the presence of doubles, 19 it is ironic that the 
only identical duplicate characters found in the novel are those of Rachael 
Rosen and Pris Stratton. Rather than represent them as mirror images of one 
another, however, Dick portrays the two as the separate fragments of a single 
self. There are several instances in the novel that support this theory, the first 
19 Even the plot itself is presented as a double narrative where, as Patricia Warrick argues "the 
Isidore chapters are interwoven with the Deckard chapters, the action in one echoing the other 
but reversing it" (123). 
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one being the fact that Pris initially introduces herself to Isidore as "Rachael 
Rosen" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 59). A second hint that Rachael and Pris 
are two aspects of the same person can be found when Rachael reveals to 
Deckard that Pris "is the same type as 1 am" (Dick, Do Androids Dream 164) 
and later declares herself a "representative of a type" (Dick, Do Androids 
Dream 165). Although the novel insists that the two characters are of the same 
"type," they are in fact very different. On the one hand, Rachael, the original 
Nexus-6 model, is represented as feminine, approachabIe, and refined. On the 
other hand, Pris, the replicated version of RachaeI, is portrayed as masculine, 
col d, and sadistic. In psychoanalytic terms, the two characters represent the 
concept of the double's dissociation from ils original source for the purpose of 
self-identification. Consequently, a perpetuaI struggle ensues between the 
original and its double, wherein there is a constant balancing and negating of 
the one facet of the self with the other. For example, when Rachael is making 
love to Deckard, Pris is mutilating a living creature; hence, the representation of 
a struggle between two opposite psyches is occurring. If one considers that 
both scenes are meant to be envisioned by the reader simultaneously, sex and 
death are united and although the two seem to contradict each other, they both 
exist. By the novel's conclusion, Rachael not only cornes to term with her 
darker side but actuall y surrenders herself to it by allowing jealousy and rage to 
cloud her judgment and lead her to murder Deckard's goal. Such an act reflects 
the fusion of human emotion and android indifference as a means to show how 
we are aIl in a sense both human and non-human: 
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The act conflates her jealousy of the goat with revenge for 
Deckard' s killing her friends. The mixture of human passion 
and cold calculation in Rachael's responses shows that she 
combines within herself attributes of the dark-haired girl and of 
the android. The closer the relationship [with Deckard] gets to 
intimacy, the wilder the oscillations between these subject 
positions become." (173) 
The Rachael Rosen that we see at the end of the novel, the one who viciously 
kills an animal, is a far cry from the woman who initially tells Deckard that she 
would "never" (44) terminate an innocent life. This does not, however, reflect 
the manifestation of Rachael's fear that her evil double will murder her and take 
over her life. Instead, Pris has always been a crucial part of Rachael' s existence, 
representing the dark, mechanical side of human nature which is drawn out, 
ironically, through human experience, emotion and our relationships with 
others. The struggle between Rachael and Pris is also one between life's 
contraries: life and death, logic and emotion, masculine and feminine etc. The 
fluctuation between each set of concepts is represented by Dick, through his 
portrayal of Rachael and Pris, in su ch a way that, although they are polar 
opposites, both exist and form two halves of a single authentic self. 
Unlike sorne of the other doubles portrayed in Dick's novel, Rachael 
and Pris never meet. Even so, Dick's readers get a sense of an ongoing struggle 
between these women through the novel's double narrative. In Marxist terms, 
this invisible war between Rachael and Prise can be considered as class-based: 
the capitalist (Rachael) versus the working class (Pris). Rachael is involved in 
a large and profitable corporation, while Pris works as a domestic slave. 
Rachael has a good educational background, while Pris does not. And, Rachael 
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appears to have the financial means to afford her own living space, while Pris is 
homeless and presently living off the charity of Isidore in a run-down apartment. 
According to Marx, "the history of aIl hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles" (Marx and Engels 219). Although they never come across each 
other, the history of this political struggle affects them and pins them against 
each other. It classifies Pris and Rachael as polar opposites and forces them to 
become class enemies. 
Another interesting fact about Dick's portrayal of the double is the ways 
in which it manifests itself through continuaI repetition. The character of Roy 
Baty exhibits many of the same personality-traits and actions of previous 
doubles in literature, therefore portraying the return of the repressed in 
humankind. In considering that Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? revisits 
themes from Frankenstein and Paradise Lost and their interpretation of the 
story of Genesis, one may argue that Baty is the intertextual double of Shelley's 
creature and Milton's Satan. As Francavilla argues, "Roy Batty, like 
Frankenstein's monster, is a Promethean rebel struggling against the tyrannical 
ruling authority who created him and who rejects his pleas for 'more life' with 
his Eve-like mate and his own kind" (8). Indeed, Baty can be viewed as the 
monster' s futuristic double, if we consider the emulation of the latter' s story in 
Dick's representation of Baty. The similarities between Baty and the monster 
create a sense of the uncanny in that they remind us of the anxiety expressed by 
Shelley with respect to the dangers of seeking to achieve godhead through 
science. Moreover, the similarities connect the two characters with another key 
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figure, their predecessor double, Milton's Satan. Both in Frankenstein and Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? the image of Satan-one of the earliest 
instances of the double-is recalled as a means of evoking the return of our 
unconscious fears. Baty, Frankenstein's monster, and Satan represent the 
constant repetition, from one generation to the next, of past human conduct and 
ideologies. Images of hate, violence and rivalry repeat themselves from one 
double to its descendant, creating an incessant imitation of actions and ideas, 
which always lead to the return of the same primitive belief in the immortal 
soul coupled with the anxiety surrounding the "other" as harbinger of death. 
This Freudian notion is also explored by Francavilla who argues that: 
On the one hand, we view the android or robot with awe and 
wonder [ ... ] They are the perfect creations we hope for, 
replications of ourselves. We envy their perfection, their 
flawless, strong, tireless bodies. They satisfy our wish for 
immortality, for housing our soul and mind in a precisely 
engineered body, free from injury or disease. On the other hand, 
androids and robots are projections of our fears concerning 
dehumanizing technology ron rampant and scientific creations 
out of control. In fact, these artificial forms of life mainly have 
been seen in fiction as dangerous and demonic. Even early 
legends concerning the creation of artificiallife [ ... ] express 
the strong fear that [it] will turn demonic, will ron amok, and 
will very likely threaten its human creators. (7) 
Francavilla's analysis exemplifies my argument that Baty, in his 
charact~rization as the intertextual double of Shelley's monster and Milton's 
Satan, represents the re-emergence of primitive notions which repeat 
themselves throughout history and serve as a reflection of our innermost fears. 
Like his predecessor doubles, Baty is the result of humankind's narcissistic 
desire to recreate a perfect version of ourselves, free from the confines of illness 
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and death. Similarly to the monster and Satan, however, Baty represents the 
fear of rivalry that could occur, foIlowing the creation of such a perfect being, 
where the doubles compete "for the same space or location, the same position 
or rank, the same right to existence" (Francavilla 7). Even more frightful, Baty 
represents the fear that the replicated self may appropriate the original. Having 
said this, Dick's doubling of characters outside of the context of Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? represents humankind's hidden impulses, which, 
des pite our best attempt to bury them, find their way back to the surface 
through the familiar, and metamorphose into the unknown, the dreadful, the 
horrifying. 
In this chapter, 1 have argued that Dick' s androids can be considered as 
authentic persons, on the grounds that they fit into our prerequisites of what a 
self consists of. But the purpose of Dick's androids is not a simple question of 
whether or not they are human, or independent individuals. The androids also 
serve as a literary device used by Dick to express a critique of the state of 
human identity as weIl. Through his portrayal of the android as an exact human 
reproduction, Dick brings us face to face with our mirror-image, the result of 
which is not the Narcissistic love that humankind originally hopes for. Instead, 
the person we see in the mirror reflects the fear, hate and hypocrisy of the 
human race. 
Conclusion 
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Philip K. Dick is an author whose career centered on the portrayal of 
mechanical constructs coming to life and masquerading as humans. Yet he did 
not foresee the full magnitude of su ch a scenario and how it might one day 
become a possibility: " [ ... ] inadvertedly 1 blended the human and the 
construct and didn't notice that such a blend might, in time, actually begin to 
become part of our reality" (Dick, "The Android" 185). What began as a talent 
of telling fictional stories about aliens, androids, machines and their 
interrelationships with humans actually developed into a philosophical quest to 
ascertain the concept of reality, as weIl as what constitutes our definition of the 
human. Dick states: 
1 can honestly say that certain matters absolutely fascinate me, 
and that 1 write about themall the time. The two basic topics 
that fascinate me are "What is reality?" and "What constitutes 
the authentic human being?" Over the twenty-seven years in 
which 1 have published novels and stories. 1 have investigated 
those two interrelated topics over and over again. 1 consider 
them important topics. What are we? What is it that surrounds 
us, that we can calI the not-me, or the empirical or phenomenal 
world? (Dick, "How to Build a Universe" 260) 
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is the result of Dick' s fixation on the 
issues of reality and the human. And what is particularly striking about the 
novel is how the author is able to draw his readers into a web of questioning, 
repeating and confusing, in order to demonstrate how what we know to be the 
"true" meaning of the human is in fact a lie. 
In writing this thesis, 1 have attempted to identify the factors involved in 
the formation of the human and show the injurious consequences when one 
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considers su ch features as absolute. In the first part of my study, l have argued 
that Dick' s text reflects anxieties of the past regarding the human condition and, 
more speci fic aIl y, the state ofwomanhood by considering Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep? as a rewrite of Paradise Lost and Frankenstein. In doing so, 
l have shown how the females in Dick's novet act as the intertextual doubles of 
Frankenstein's monster and Milton's Eve and show how Dick swerves away 
from the predecessor texts by rewriting the feminine into the image of the 
cyborg, a androgynous creature. Secondly, l have demonstrated how the world 
is in a state of constant evolution, thus, our antiquated ideas of the human are in 
need of revision. Hayles states that humanism is in the process of extinction 
and that modem sciences have rendered us as "posthuman." Ironically, Dick 
envisions such a state of the human long before its arrivaI, through his portrayal 
of the android: a being that represents the literaI embodiment of the blending of 
the artificial with the organic. Next, through my evaluation of the social 
construction of "self," l have concluded that Dick' s androids are socially 
excluded as persons on the grounds that they are dismissed as lifeless non-
humans, even though they exhibit signs of animation and individualîsm. 
Finally, if there is one quote which l believe sums up Dick's views on 
authentic human identity, it is found in Deckard's declaration that: "The electric 
things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are" (Dick 214). Not only is 
this statement a prophecy of things to come, that is, his view that our 
mechanical constructs are coming to life; but it also pinpoints the answer to 
Dick's question about what it means to be human: the ability to empathize with, 
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embrace and respect other forms of life. Do Androids Dremll of Electric Sheep? 
serves as a rejection of society' s conventional delineation of the human, which 
divides, constrains and commits the act of anthropocentrism. The author caUs 
for a reconstruction of the human, which can onl y be achieved through "merry 
defiance" and "spirited, although not spiritual, bravery and uniqueness" (Dick 
"The Android" 209). If one would only release their inhibitions and recognize 
that the y are in unison with their double, the android, the other, Dick suggests 
that the future will be a much better place for humans and non-humans alike. 
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